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AN ESSAY ON THE NORMATIVE
FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
MICHAEL S. JACOBS*
Since the 1980s, the Chicago School model of antitrust
economics has reigned as the predominant approach of both courts
and agencies. Today, the primary debate among antitrust
economists involves competing views about the nature of the
market and the role that the courts should take in enforcing
antitrust law. Chicagoans believe that markets are generally
efficient, that market imperfections are usually self-correcting, and
that, in the name of efficiency, courts should show restraint in their
rulings. "Post-Chicagoans" view market imperfections to be more
frequent and persistent, and would have courts and agencies
undertake a more complex assessment of allegedly uncompetitive
practices to decide whether intervention in the market is
appropriate. Post-Chicagoans believe that while this type of
governmental intervention is costly, it can ultimately succeed in
promoting a more efficient market.
In this Essay, Professor Jacobs chronicles the rise of the
Chicago School and details the contours of the debate between
Chicago and post-Chicago. While both camps have put forth
studies and data to provide empirical proof for their economic
assertions, Professor Jacobs argues that the data is inconclusive,
and. that the type of information needed is not currently available
or attainable. Professor Jacobs suggests that this empirical
impasse can be resolved only by an open discussion of the value
choices that underlie both Chicago and post-Chicago theories.
Using the recent Kodak decision as an illustration, Professor
Jacobs argues that decisions about antitrust policy must not hinge
on inadequate economic data, but rather on the acceptance or
rejection of normative, political assumptions.
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, 1971; B.A.,
Dartmouth College, 1968. The author wishes to thank his colleagues Roberta Kwall,
Margit Livingston, Stephen Siegel, and Mark Weber for their comments and suggestions,
John Mooney for his valuable research assistance, and the Faculty Research Fund of the
DePaul University College of Law for its support.
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INTRODUCrION
During the 1970s the most important debate among antitrust
scholars centered on the extent to which an exclusively economic
approach should govern the judicial analysis of arguably anticom-
petitive behavior. Members of the Chicago School contended that
consumer welfare, narrowly conceived in explicitly economic terms,
should be the only object of inquiry.' Other approaches, they
claimed, were "untheoretical, descriptive ... and even meta-
phorical,"'2 substituting "casual observation," "colorful charac-
terization," and "eclectic forays into sociology and psychology" for
"the careful definitions and parsimonious logical structure of
economic theory."3 Those in the opposing camp, sometimes called
the "Modern Populist School,"4 did not seek to exclude economics
from antitrust analysis, but argued that courts should resort to other
interpretive tools as well. In their view, the antitrust laws were
enacted to combat deeply felt social and political problems. A policy
that ignored those concerns would be "unresponsive to the will of
Congress and out of touch with the rough political consensus" that
supports antitrust.
5
This debate enlivened antitrust scholarship for a generation, but
by the end of the 1980s Chicago's position had proved persuasive to
federal administrative agencies and most courts. 6 Increasingly, those
authorities conceived of competition strictly in terms of allocative
1. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV.
213, 215 (1985) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, After Chicago] ("The Chicago School model of
antitrust policy dictates that allocative efficiency as defined by the market should be the
only goal of the antitrust laws."). "Allocative efficiency refers to the welfare of society as
a whole. Given a certain amount of inputs or resources, what use and assignment of these
resources will make society best off?" HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAW 46 (1st ed. 1985).
2. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 928 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis].
3. Id at 929.
4. See Barbara Ann White, Countervailing Power-Different Rules for Different
Markets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and Economics, 41 DUKE L.J. 1045,1055
(1992).
5. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1052
(1979) [hereinafter Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust].
6. See Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games
Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892, 892 (1988); Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note
1, at 216.
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efficiency,7 rejecting the concerns for small business and competitive
process that informed the antitrust philosophy of the Warren Court
and animated much of the scholarship critical of Chicago.8 Though
some opponents have continued to question the historical and political
underpinnings of Chicago's approach,9 by 1981 a prominent member
of Chicago's opposition had conceded that "regard for efficiency is in
the ascendancy";10 by 1987, Chicago partisans could proudly proclaim
that "antitrust law has become ... a branch of economics";" and by
7. By the late 1980s, several opinions of the United States Supreme Court, along with
revisions to the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, strongly suggested that antitrust
authorities had adopted Chicago's exclusive focus on allocative efficiency. See; e.g.,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,588-89 (1986) (accepting
implicitly Chicago's view of predatory pricing); Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,296 (1985) (adding market power requirement to
prohibition against group boycotts); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-07 (1984) ("Restrictions on price and output
are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade...."); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (indicating that antitrust jurisprudence should
primarily deal with "market considerations," and not with "restrictions on the autonomy
of independent businessmen"); see also Oliver Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO.
L.J 271, 273-74 (1987) [hereinafter Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust] ("The differences
between the 1968 and the 1982 merger guidelines... evidence some of the changes that
resulted from the paradigm shift away from market power (monopolizing) in favor of
efficiency (economizing).").
8. Chicago's critics interpreted both the Warren Court's solicitude for the
preservation of small business-expressed most clearly in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294,315-16 (1962) and United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
276 (1966)-and its concern for fairness in the competitive process-typified by Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959)-as the groundwork of a
jurisprudence focused not only on allocative efficiency; but also on fairness, consumer
choice, product innovation, decentralized decisionmaking, and the continued economic
independence of small business. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of
Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917, 919. 922-23 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust What Fairness Means and
Why It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 265, 269-87 (1994); James May, Antitrust in the
Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis,
1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 257, 259 (1989); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the
Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1222-23 (1988); Rudolph J. Peritz, The "Rule
of Reason" in AntitrusL Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285,
287 (1989); F.M. Scherer, Efficiency, Fairness, and the Early Contributions of Economists
to the Antitrust Debate, 29 WAsHBURN L.J. 243, 247 (1990).
10. Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140,1140 (1981) [hereinafter Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust]; see
also Robert H. Lande, Commentary: Implications of Professor Scherer's Research for the
Future of Antitrust, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 256,258 (1990) ("[Ihe dominant paradigm today
is that the only goal of the existing antitrust laws is to increase economic efficiency....").
11. Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J.
305, 305 (1987) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks].
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1993, a non-aligned scholarly observer could plausibly conclude that
"today we tend to view antitrust in technocratic terms."'
2
Drained of its vitality, the old debate between Chicago's
exclusively economic viewpoint and the socio-political perspective of
its Modem Populist critics has lately ceded priority of place to an
intramural dispute between antitrust economists. Over the past ten
years, the terms of the scholarly discourse have shifted. A post-
Chicago School of economics' 3 has arisen, working within the
efficiency model, but starting from assumptions and ending with an
enforcement methodology markedly different from Chicago's.
Though these differences constitute the core of their dispute, the
Chicago and post-Chicago Schools share common ground that invests
their controversy with a thematic unity absent from previous debates
about antitrust policy. Both agree that economics is "the essence of
antitrust"'4 and that protecting consumer welfare, conceived in
allocative efficiency terms, should be the exclusive goal of competition
law. Both eschew the subjective inquiries that they ascribe to the
overtly political approaches of the past, and both assert that unless
business conduct raises prices or reduces output it should be left
alone, regardless of the political or distributive consequences. 5
The new debate involves contending visions of the workings of
the market mechanism and of the proper model for antitrust
enforcement. Chicagoans believe that markets tend toward efficiency,
that market imperfections 6 are normally transitory, and that judicial
enforcement should proceed cautiously, lest it mistakenly proscribe
behavior that promotes consumer welfare. 7  Post-Chicagoans, by
12. OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, VOL. VIII: TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 107 (1993).
13. The term "post-Chicago" apparently was coined by Professor Hovenkamp. See
Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 1, at 225 (describing the post-Chicago approach
as "both more complex and more ambiguous than the Chicago School model").
14. Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago
School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 646 (1989).
15. l.
16. Market imperfections include such phenomena as contractual precommitment,
network externalities, installed base, sunk costs, and information and switching costs. See
Post-Chicago Analysis After Kodak. Interview with Professor Steven C. Salop, ANTITRUST,
Fall/Winter 1992, at 20, 20 [hereinafter Interview with Professor Salop].
" 17. Judge Easterbrook, a pillar of the Chicago School, has observed that "if the court
errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good.. . . If the court
errs by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time.
Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry." Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 2 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust].
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contrast, believe that market failures are not necessarily self-correc-
ting, and that firms can therefore take advantage of imperfections,
such as information gaps or competitors' sunk costs, 18 to produce
inefficient results even in ostensibly competitive markets. They argue
that the distortions to competition made possible by market imperfec-
tions should prompt enforcement authorities to scrutinize a wider
variety of conduct than Chicagoans would examine.'9 On the
doctrinal level, this debate has produced conflicting answers to some
of antitrust's most pressing questions: the relevant measures of
market power,' the competitive effects of tying arrangements2' and
18. When investments are irreversible-that is, when they have little or no value in
some other use, or cannot be recovered in a liquidation sale-expenditures on them are
called sunk costs. See Baker, supra note 14, at 651.
19. See Interview with Professor Salop, supra note 16, at 20 ("Post-Chicago analysis
does not unskeptically attribute efficiency properties to conduct and it is more open to the
possibility of anticompetitive effects. Thus, it is more open to intervention by policy
makers."); Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537, 537 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) ("Theoretical models studied here provide a guarded support
for the proposition that strategic choices made by dominant firms are not invariably
consistent with the objective of welfare-maximization and that some constraints on firm
behavior may, in fact, increase welfare.").
20. Market power is generally defined as the ability of a firm (or group of firms acting
collectively) profitably to raise price by reducing output. See, e.g., U.S. Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines-1984, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at
20,556 (June 14, 1984) (defining market power as the "ability of one or more firms
profitably to maintain price above a competitive level for a significant period of time");
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 937, 937 (1981) ("[M]arket power refers to the ability of a firm ... to raise price
above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase
is unprofitable and must be rescinded."). While making allowance for entry conditions and
aspects of industry structure that permit collusion in unconcentrated markets, Chicagoans
generally infer market power from market concentration, using market share as the
relevant proxy. Id. at 938. In the past ten years, however, economists associated with the
post-Chicago School have developed a variety of new techniques for measuring market
power, techniques that are recognized to require even more empirical investigation than
the market share test, but that are claimed to provide a more accurate picture of market
dynamics. See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of
Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 5-15 (1992).
21. "A tie-in or tying arrangement is a sale or lease of one product or service on the
condition that the buyer take a second product or service as well." HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 351 (1994). Tying arrangements may violate § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3 of
the Clayton Act. The standard formulation for determining their legality appears in
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (stating that tie-ins "are
unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the
tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected"). See
also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992)
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other vertical restraints,' the economic plausibility of predatory
pricing schemes,' and the durability of cartels and oligopolies.24
On its surface, the nature of this debate confirms the view that
antitrust analysis has taken a decidedly technological turn. Talk of
political values is conspicuously absent from the discussion, which
employs the vocabulary of academic economics and relies frequently
on complicated mathematical proofs.2- What apparently divide the
(stating the test for determining whether an arrangement violates § 1 of the Sherman Act);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) (stating that "[w]hen
the seller has some special ability.., to force a purchaser to do something that he would
not do in a competitive market," the Supreme Court has "found the tying arrangement to
be unlawful").
22. Chicago scholars are skeptical that exclusive contracts, in which, for example, one
party agrees to purchase all its requirements from the other, threaten significant
competitive harm. On their view, exclusionary practices tend to be unprofitable because
the party whose freedom is restricted will invariably insist on compensation for limiting its
options. For that reason, firms will rarely engage in exclusionary practices; when they do,
it is safe to assume that the practices are more efficient than alternative arrangements.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 203
(1976) [hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW] (stating that predatory pricing strategies
may be unlikely to be profitable "given the risks faced by the predator and the responses
available to rivals"); Aaron Director & Edward Levi, Law and the Future: Trade
Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 292 (1956). Post-Chicagoans, by contrast, have
developed theoretical models demonstrating that exclusion may be privately profitable yet
socially wasteful. See Phillipe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry,
77 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 388 (1987); Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract
Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1161-64
(1993).
23. Predatory pricing occurs when a firm prices below cost in order to drive a rival
from the market or discipline the rival for competing vigorously. See Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2587 (1993) (describing the
prerequisites for recovery under the Robinson-Patman Act). Chicagoans doubt whether
predatory pricing schemes make economic sense from the perspective of the would-be
predator. See Frank A. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 264 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies]. But post-Chicagoans regard predatory strategies as highly plausible
under a variety of circumstances. See, eg., Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman,
Strategic Business Behavior and Antitrust, in ECONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 39,47-63
(Robert J. Lamer & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989).
24. "The strategic oligopoly m6dels [employed by post-Chicago analysts] ... are
typically richer and more complex than the standard Chicago models of either perfect
competition or monopoly. These models also suggest a greater scope for antitrust
intervention into markets than does the static Chicago-School model." Steven Salop,
Kodak as Post-Chicago Law and Economics, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES PERSP., Apr.
1993, at 1, 4.
25. See, eg., Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 127, 134 (1990) [hereinafter Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure] (using
the "envelope theorem" and "Shepard's lemma" to derive a differential equation denoting
the level of anticipated profitability from integrated operations necessary to persuade a
downstream oligopolist to merge with its upstream oligopolist supplier).
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parties are not their political ideologies or interpretations of history,
but differing evaluations of the efficiency implications of their
respective theories and methodologies. Indeed, some post-Chicagoans
characterize their work not as an alternative to Chicago thinking but
as a refinement of it, an effort to provide decisionmakers with a more
accurate picture of the marketplace and more sensitive tools for
detecting inefficient behavior.26
These appearances, however, are deceptive. The parties' shared
commitment to efficiency and the debate's specialized vocabulary
mask deep divisions regarding the normative assumptions most
appropriate to competition policy. The contending economic models
reflect very different views of human nature, firm behavior, and
judicial competence. While Chicagoans assume that the desire to
maximize profits drives firms to compete away market imperfections
and destabilizes collusive activity, post-Chicagoans believe that
strategizing firms can create or perpetuate market imperfections that
can seriously hamper competitive balance. Similarly, while
Chicagoans presuppose that markets promote efficient business
behavior and that judges untrained in economics are ill-equipped to
identify and measure market imperfections, post-Chicagoans have less
trust in markets and more confidence in the judiciary's ability to
distinguish between competitive and anticompetitive conduct.
Post-Chicagoans have shown that the neoclassical price model is
not the only method for analyzing the efficiency questions central to
antitrust. They have demonstrated that economists equally loyal to
the goal of consumer welfare can disagree markedly with price
theorists about the means most conducive to allocative efficiency. In
doing so, however, they have revealed, albeit unintentionally, the
inability of economics to furnish empirical or theoretical criteria for
resolving the differences between their model and Chicago's. Their
work has produced a stalemate in economic theory that effectively
requires antitrust decisionmakers, most of whom accept the legitimacy
of the economic model, to probe the technocratic surface of the
current debate and evaluate the conflicting beliefs about firms,
markets, and governments embedded in its foundation. Ironically, far
from having marginalized the role of value choice in antitrust
discourse, the ascendancy of economic models underscores its
enduring importance.
26. See, e.g., Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 7, at 280.
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This Essay does not aim to refute the thesis that economics is a
scientific discipline.27 Nor does it seek to establish the indeterminacy
of economic thinking,' or the failure of the law and economics
movement to incorporate broader measures of personal and social
well-being that reflect more fully the work of other social sciences.29
Rather, it argues that the contemporary debate between antitrust
economists demonstrates how efforts to base antitrust policy solely
upon economic theory inevitably draw on political assumptions about
the marketplace and the proper role of enforcement authorities. It
contends that inconclusive evidence of the efficiency effects of many
business practices, and the inability of economic theory to determine
which model promises greater efficiency, expose these political
assumptions and effectively transform the economics debate into a
political one. Finally, it suggests that antitrust discourse would benefit
from the acknowledgment by policymakers that the current economic
debate is theoretically and empirically irresolvable, and from their
express recognition that the choice between conflicting economic
models constitutes a normative ordering of divergent political beliefs.
I. ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AS APPLIED SCIENCE: THE
EMERGENCE AND ASCENDANCY OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
The Chicago School is hardly the first to have developed an
economic approach to antitrust. In almost every era of antitrust
history, policymakers have employed economic models to explain or
modify the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement."
27. For an attempt to refute that thesis, see Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis
of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsiftability and
Normative Bias, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 231,233 (1991) ("[A]ny evaluative criteria that
can be provided by economics are necessarily political and ideological 'all the way
down.' ").
28. For an argument that economics is indeterminate as a guide to legal problem-
solving, see James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 app. at
1051 (1985) (indicating the difficulty of using policy and economics to construct convincing
legal arguments). For a rebuttal, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRRDENCE 255-59 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE].
29. For an argument that the methodology of law and economics improperly
constrains the meaning of "welfare" by failing to consider the teachings of other
disciplines, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 4, 11 (1994).
30. See Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 1, at 220-25. According to Professor
Hovenkamp, "one must go all the way back to the first thirty years of antitrust
enforcement to find a policy that can reasonably be characterized as having little or no
economic content." ld. at 220. Professor May has argued persuasively that, even in the
earliest days of antitrust history, notions of classical economics, as well as "historical" or
[Vol. 74
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What distinguishes Chicago from its predecessors is not its application
of economic theory, but its insistence on two fundamental
propositions: that allocative efficiency, narrowly conceived, should be
the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws; and that the legislative history
of those laws requires, or at least permits, the judicial implementation
of that narrow efficiency goal.
Chicago scholars rose to prominence in the late 1960s, offering
a theory of business behavior that ran counter to the views of the
then-dominant Harvard School of industrial organization.31 The
Harvard School was distrustful of large firms and concentrated
industries.32 Its members undertook detailed case studies of par-
ticular industries, 3 and on the basis of their results postulated that
economies of scale rarely required firms to grow very large,34 that
dominant firms could readily create substantial entry barriers for
newcomers,35  and that markets performed uncompetitively at
relatively low levels of concentration.36 These postulates led
Harvard theorists to view large firms and mergers with suspicion and
to explain non-standard or unfamiliar business practices as motivated
"new" school approaches to economic theory, contributed significantly to the debates over
antitrust legislation and helped to inform judicial decisionmaking at the state and national
levels. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 283-88 (1989).
31. For a discussion and analysis of Industrial Organization (1.0.) philosophy, see
Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization, 16 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 487 (1983). The guiding principles of that philosophy have been
summarized as follows: "The basic 1.0. ideas are, first, that industry details have to be
understood before policymakers can gain useful insights ... and, second, that an industry's
structure influences the conduct of firms within it." ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 112 (1989).
32. See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 462-63 (2d ed. 1968); Leonard W.
Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1104, 1105 (1979).
33. See, eg., JAMES W. MCKIE, TIN CANS AND TIN PLATE: A STUDY OF COM-
PETITION IN TWO RELATED MARKETS (1959); Joe S. Bain, Economies of Scale,
Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM.
ECON. REV. 15 (1954) [hereinafter Bain, Economies of Scale].
34. See Bain, Economies of Scale, supra note 33, at 38.
35. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1-42 (1956).
36. Id.
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by monopolistic intent,37 positions largely adopted in important
antitrust opinions of the Warren Court. 8
Chicagoans disagreed with both the research methodology and
the policy conclusions of the Harvard School. They contended that
a lack of intellectual rigor, arguably the product of a bias against big
business, led Harvard scholars to conclude mistakenly that large firms
operated less efficiently than smaller ones and that non-standard
contracting practices betokened monopolistic intent. Members of the
Chicago School argued that efficiency, not monopoly, explained these
phenomena.39 On their view, firms using innovative contractual
arrangements were presumptively trying to economize on transaction
costs or discourage free-riding.4 Large firms that had attained their
size through internal growth had presumably achieved superior
efficiencies or realized important economies of scale.41
Working from a model of perfect competition42 founded in
37. Ronald Coase summarized this view, and remarked critically that
[i]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or
another-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.
And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable
practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation,
frequent.
R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in ECONOMIC RESEARCH:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECr: POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972).
38. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,344 (1962) (declaring that
Congress intended amended § 7 of the Clayton Act "to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses"); see also United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966) (invalidating merger between grocery store chains
that would have produced post-merger firm with 7.5% of the relevant market, citing
"threatening trend toward concentration" in Los Angeles retail grocery industry as
justification).
39. See, eg., Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra note 2, at 926-33
(citing Chicago literature and articulating the specifics of Chicago theory).
40. Id
41. See, ag., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 430 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX]; see also
F.M. Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 15 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974)
[hereinafter INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION] (addressing whether high levels of industrial
concentration are based upon economies of scale); John S. McGee, Efficiency and
Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra, at 55 (same); F.M. Scherer,
Commentary, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra, at 97 (same); John S. McGee,
Commentary, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra, at 101 (same); Dialogue, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra, at 105 (same).
42. Descriptions of perfect competition usually include four assumptions:
homogeneous products, identical with respect to physical characteristics, quality and
service, so that only price determines sales; perfectly informed buyers and sellers; instantly
mobile and infinitely divisible productive assets, capable of flowing immediately from one
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neoclassical price theory,43 Chicagoans constructed a relatively simple
analytical framework within which the drive for greater efficiency
accounts for almost all competitively ambiguous business behavior.4
This framework, they claimed, permits courts to interpret commercial
behavior coherently, efficiently, and free of political bias4 Since
price theory views firms as profit-maximizers,' it regards
conspiracies as inherently unstable,47 monopoly markets as self-
correcting,48 and entry barriers-except for those imposed by
government regulation-as inadequate to prevent the flow of capital
to profitable markets.49 These premises led Chicagoans to argue that
antitrust enforcement should punish only inefficient con-
market to another with changes in demand; and a sufficient number of sellers, independent
and of roughly equal size, so that no one seller can unilaterally affect output or price. See,
e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 4-5 (1985); F.M.
SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCrURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 15-18 (3d ed. 1990).
43. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 87-89 (3d ed. 1966).
44. See Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, supra note 2, at 926-33
(citing Chicago literature and articulating the specifics of Chicago theory).
45. Cf. id. at 926-33 (criticizing the concepts of industrial organization as being derived
from the unsystematic and superficial observation of business).
46. Although Chicago and post-Chicago economists share the assumption that firms
seek to maximize profit, others theorize that the limits of human knowledge and the
inclination to follow proven patterns of behavior lead firms to "satisfice"--that is, to set
profit goals intentionally short of maximal levels. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 113-16,
303-08 (1967) (arguing that terms used by Adam Smith, such as "the profit motive," no
longer accurately describe modem corporations); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR 61-78 (2d ed. 1957) (describing how good administrators make choices with
incomplete knowledge); Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market
Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 3, 28-29 (1984) (arguing that in
modem corporations in which ownership is separate from control, the assumption that a
person is acting to maximize profit becomes more complicated).
47. Since cartel members usually have different marginal costs, agreeing on a common
price forces low-cost firms to accommodate higher-cost co-conspirators; at the same time,
the desire to maximize profits enhances the temptation of the low-cost firms to cheat on
the cartel by making secret, below-cost sales-a practice that is difficult to detect and
police, and that will frequently destabilize the cartel and lead to its collapse. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 47-48
(1974); cf. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 41, at 179-91(arguing that
oligopolies do not result in substantial restrictions of output; acknowledging that cartels
are fragile).
48. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 17, at 2.
49. Cf. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 41, at 310-29 (explaining the
difference between natural and artificial barriers to entry, and arguing that antitrust law
should seek only to punish predation).
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duct°--which they defined as conduct that reduces output 5 t-and
to criticize the Warren Court and its predecessors for having
established an "inhospitality tradition of antitrust" 2 characterized by
the reflexive judicial proscription of business practices whose novelty
blinded courts to their efficiency. 3
Chicago scholars claimed that linking antitrust policy to price
theory would remove competition law from the political arena and set
it on a scientific 4 course.5 Price theory, they argued, evaluates
competitive well-being not by reference to subjective beliefs but by
objective observation of the effects of business behavior on output
and price. It thus transcends partisan politics and avoids idiosyncratic
assessments of such issues as the value of small business, distributional
justice, and "fair" competitive processes.56 For Chicagoans, the
50. See, e.g., William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 652, 652-61 (1983) (arguing that an optimal antitrust fine equal to "the net harm
to persons other than the offender" yields an efficient outcome); Warren F. Schwartz, An
Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1075-76 (1980)
(describing the difficulties of applying economic analysis to enforcement policies).
51. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L.
& ECON. 7, 7 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Policy of the Sherman Act] (arguing that proper
antitrust policy "requires courts to distinguish between agreements or activities that
increase wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it through restriction of
output").
52. Attributing this phrase to Professor Turner, Judge Easterbrook remarked that it
stands for the judicial habit of "view[ing] each business practice with suspicion, always
wondering how firms are using it to harm consumers." Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, supra note 17, at 4. The phrase may have originated, however, with Professor
Williamson. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1540 (1981) (describing the "inhospitality
tradition" in antitrust as "ingrained public policy animosity" toward organizational
innovations, because of their suspected departures from the competitive model).
53. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV.
705, 714 & n.42 (1982) (citing some antitrust cases in which the Supreme Court calls for
economic analysis, and others in which the Court "condemn[s] efficiency as a source of
evil").
54. See, e.g., BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 41, at 8 ("Basic
microeconomic theory is of course a science, though like many other sciences it is by no
means complete in all its branches. Were it not a science, rational antitrust policy would
be impossible."). Efforts by economists to characterize their work as scientific are almost
as old as the discipline itself. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 261 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., 1968) (1651) (asserting that the skill of making and maintaining commonwealths
"consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on
Practise onely").
55. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 92-94 (1981) (explaining
that efficiency can be defended on the ground that it allows issues of allocation to be
discussed separately from issues of distribution).
56. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1,16-26 (1982); see also BORK, THE ANTTrRUST PARADOX, supra note 41,
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movement away from these "nebulous values"'57 marked "an intellec-
tual shift in the underpinnings of antitrust."58  ]Even for neutral
observers, the changes wrought by Chicago constituted "a genuine
scientific revolution."59
Chicagoans also contended that their approach would economize
on the cost of antitrust enforcement and litigation. By defining
anticompetitive behavior solely in terms of price and output, the
Chicago model arguably furnishes enforcement authorities with simple
quantitative tests that remove the guesswork from antitrust ad-
judication. Its mathematical simplicity presumably frees courts from
the need to hazard qualitative judgments about the supposed norms
of business competition or the inchoate effects of corporate size on
the body politic.' In addition, Chicagoans contended, by defining
expanded output and lower prices as the exclusive measure of welfare,
their methodology avoids the problems associated with weighing and
balancing the conflicting interests of different market segments, such
as consumers and small business.6  Finally, Chicago scholars
believed that the clarity of their approach would enable firms to
predict more accurately the legal consequences of important business
practices, and would thereby promote capital investment and
generally facilitate private ordering.62"
at 429 (criticizing those who would encourage judicial consideration of "an open-ended list
of attractive-sounding goals to be weighed against consumer welfare").
57. Bork, Policy of the Sherman Act, supra note 51, at 9. According to Judge Bork,
importing noneconomic values into antitrust jurisprudence was closely akin to playing
"tennis with the net down." Id. at 10.
58. Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST
L.J. 21, 25 (1985) [hereinafter Bork, The Role of the Courts].
59. William Frech, Comments on Antitrust Issues, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON. &
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 263, 264 (1987).
60. Chicago scholars criticize judicial concern for a "fair" competitive process on
several grounds. Professor Stigler characterized the fairness concept as "a suitcase full of
bottled ethics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of justice." George
J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1972). Similarly, Professors Areeda and Turner state that "[a]s a goal of
antitrust policy, 'fairness' is a vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens to
favor." 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 109a, at 21 (1978). Instead of
focusing on the plasticity of the term, Judge Easterbrook attacks the value of fair
competition itself ("Who says that competition is supposed to be fair ... ?"), declaring
that "[flair competition is tempered competition." Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d
520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. See Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 1, at 234.
62. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 17, at 14.
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Chicagoans also recognized that their policy prescriptions were
addressed to courts acting in a statutory tradition and that therefore,
no matter how intellectually compelling, their model could exert no
influence unless it furthered the intent that informed that tradition.
Accordingly, they argued that nothing in the legislative history of the
antitrust laws prevents courts from regarding allocative efficiency as
the exclusive congressional goal. Robert Bork offered the strongest
version of this argument, asserting that the Sherman Act affirmatively
"displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting
consumer welfare."'  Others took a more moderate tack, arguing
simply that the congressional debates preceding the passage of the
Sherman Act present a "confused picture" and that courts must
therefore "make sense out of the statute pretty much on their own,
without the benefit of legislative history."'  Still others, conceding
that "populist" goals underlay the history of the Sherman Act and
other antitrust laws, dismissed those goals as inappropriate to the
formulation of antitrust rules, claiming that they would "increase
vagueness in the law, and ... discourage conduct that promotes
efficiencies." 6
II. CHICAGO'S EARLY CRITICS AND THE DEMISE OF THE
POPULIST STRAIN IN ANTITRUST DISCOURSE
Chicago's approach has attracted widespread academic criticism.
Important scholarship directly contests Chicago's reading of the
legislative history of the Sherman Act.66 These scholars contend that
63. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 41, at 61. See also Bork, Policy of
the Sherman Act, supra note 51, at 7 (arguing that Congress wants the courts to implement
the policy of "consumer welfare").
64. From Von's to Schwinn to the Chicago Schook Interview with Judge Richard
Posner, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, ANTITRUST, Spring 1992, at 4. Earlier, Judge
Posner had contended that the framers of the Sherman Act "appear to have been
concerned mainly with the price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels."
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 22, at 23.
65. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust
Policy, 75 CAL. L. REv. 797, 798 (1987). Judge Easterbrook has suggested that courts
should regard the antitrust laws as a "blank check," a tabula rasa, on which they can and
should inscribe efficient policy prescriptions. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust
Policy, 84 MIcH. L. REy. 1696, 1702 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust
Policy].
66. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (arguing
that the Sherman Act was concerned with preventing unfair wealth transfers from
consumers to monopolists); May, supra note 9, at 260 (criticizing Chicago scholars, and
others, for de-emphasizing "the broader theoretical context within which early antitrust law
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Chicago's conception of allocative efficiency was not even remotely
familiar to the drafters of the Sherman Act, who conceived of
competition mainly in terms of such classical ideals as individual
liberty and freedom of choice.67 As to other statutes, especially the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the 1950 amendments to Section
7 of the Clayton Act, no one-not even a die-hard
Chicagoan-regards the legislative history as supporting the efficiency
hypothesis.68
Judge Bork's view that the history of the Sherman Act compels
a price-theory approach has come under particularly harsh attack.
One critic has characterized Bork's reading as "transparently
revisionist," dismissing it as an effort "to adjust historical facts to fit
a preordained model. ' 69 But the less doctrinaire interpretations of
other Chicagoans have survived scholarly criticism largely unscathed.
The sheer size and conceded ambiguity of the historical record, along
with the acknowledged variety of political considerations that
contributed to the final legislative product, make it difficult, if not
impossible, to advance one particular view as the definitive reading of
developed"); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 263,
272-74 [hereinafter Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law].
67. See, eg., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1989). For a discussion of the classical view of
competition, see George Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 1 (1957).
68. See, e.g., Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 233-38 (1960) (arguing that the 1950 amendments to
the Clayton Act were especially designed to protect small business); Hugh C. Hansen,
Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1113, 1114-17
(1983) (arguing that the Robinson-Patman Act was concerned mainly with protecting small
business from the buying power of large firms). In addition, the Clayton Act's prohibition
against price discrimination, originally enacted at ch. 323, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 730 (1914), now
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988), is generally conceded to have been "born
of a desire by Congress to curb the use by financially powerful corporations of localized
price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive position of other sellers."
FrC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 (1959).
69. John J. Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 SW. U.
L. REV. 335, 339-40 (1981). In recent years, even prominent Chicagoans have qualified
their initial support for Bork's thesis. See, e.g., Lloyd Constantine, An Antitrust Enforcer
Confronts the New Economics, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 662 n.7 (1989) (quoting Judge
Easterbrook's characterization of Chicago's reading of the legislative history of the
Sherman Act as "a post hoc rationalization, but.., the one I happen to favor"). In the
mid-1980s, moreover, while he continued to insist that allocative efficiency should be the
only goal of antitrust, Bork himself made some apparent concessions to his critics, revising
his earlier view and conceding that the legislative history of the antitrust laws reflects a
concern not only for efficiency but for "a potpourri of other values" as well. Bork, The
Role of the Courts, supra note 58, at 25.
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the Sherman Act's statutory background. 7° And the reading of
mainstream Chicagoans has apparently proved persuasive: Even
liberal scholars allow that most judges and academics view the
Sherman Act "as little more than a congressional mandate to develop
a federal common law of competition.'
A second strand of criticism rebuked the Chicago School for
unfairly rejecting the values informing the American tradition of
business competition. For these critics, Chicago's position on
legislative history, though incorrect, matters less than its attempt to
replace antitrust's long-standing process orientation with an outcome
measure far removed from the intellectual and political concerns
which, on their view, should animate competition law.72 Antitrust,
say these populist critics, "is rooted in a preference for pluralism,
freedom of trade, access to markets, and freedom of choice,"'73 values
ignored in Chicago's efforts to remake antitrust in its own, exclusively
economic image.
Because they regarded Chicago's efficiency presumptions and
anti-interventionist bias as unduly favorable to large and powerful
corporations, many critics accused Chicago of implementing an
agenda more ideological than intellectual, calculated to favor the
wealthy and institutionalize the economic status quo.74 Referring to
Chicago as a "Church," some attacked its analysis as a "theology...
out of touch with its own empirical and moral roots, detached from
present-day realities."'75 Others denounced it as "a sterile and
70. See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 35 (2d ed. 1989); HANS THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 226-32 (1954); William L. Letwin,
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 222,255-58
(1956).
71. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, supra note 66, at 269.
72. See, eg., Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
936, 936 (1987) (stating that the antitrust laws' "summarizing norm" is a "commitment to
the maintenance of competitive process").
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., id. at 957 ("[T]he Chicago School, in the name of law and economics, has
waged ideological warfare, assaulting antitrust itself."); Thomas M. Melsheimer, Economics
and Ideology: Antitrust in the 1980s, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1319, 1335 (1990) ("[I]n the hands
of Chicago School proponents, economics has become an engine for an ideology hostile
to the operation of antitrust laws."); Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in the
Gray Areas of Antitrus" The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) ("Chicago School analysts often give scholars the impression of
instinctively condoning business strategies and then developing post-hoc efficiency
arguments to justify those positions.").
75. Flynn, supra note 69, at 344.
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irrelevant exercise in confirming inappropriate political goals."7 6
During the second term of the Reagan presidency, this criticism
became increasingly embittered and fatalistic,7 7 reflecting in part the
populists' growing concern that the Reagan administration had
"minimalized and trivialized" the antitrust laws.78
A third form of criticism came from antitrust economists.
Though they accepted economic efficiency as the exclusive goal of
antitrust policy, these critics found fault with particular features of
Chicago's model. Some challenged the view that vertical price
restraints inevitably increase consumer welfare, arguing that price
theory's blinkered focus on marginal consumers ignored buyers within
the margin, who would not benefit from the increased services that
resale price maintenance presumably encourages. 79  Others con-
tended that by concentrating strictly on allocative efficiency,
Chicagoans overlook other types of efficiency equally important to
consumer welfare." Still others attacked Chicago's assumption that
the marginal value of a dollar is the same for different consumer
groups,8 as well as Chicago's use of static analytical models."
76. John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution
of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1987).
77. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to
Antitrust, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1163, 1167-68 (1988) (decrying the "name calling and allegations
of bad faith" on both sides of the Chicago-populist debate). Others lamented the
"attenuation of antitrust," see Robert A. Katzmann, The Attenuation of Antitrust,
BROOKINGS REXV., Summer 1984, at 23, and mourned its "euthanasia," see Walter Adams
& James W. Brock, The "New Learning" and the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1515 (1986).
78. Eleanor M. Fox & Robert Pitofsky, Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust
Alternative: Introduction, 76 GEo. L.J. 237, 237 (1987); see also Milton Handler, Is
Antitrust's Centennial a Time for Obsequies or for Renewed Faith in Its National Policy?,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1933, 1935 (1989) (criticizing the Reagan administration's "non-
enforcement" of the antitrust laws); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75
CAL. L. REv. 817, 818 (1987) ("The only matters that regularly attract the attention of the
[Reagan administration's] enforcement authorities are cartels, horizontal mergers tending
to create a monopoly, and various forms of predation.").
79. William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the
New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 999 (1985).
80. F.M. Scherer, Antitrus4 Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1002
(1987) (arguing that, while difficult to measure, the effects of "X-efficiency" (the efficiency
of production) and of long-run technological efficiency (the rate of useful invention)
probably outweigh those of allocative efficiency).
81. See, eg., Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy
Analysis in Our Worse-than-Second-Best World:" A Proposal and Related Critique of the
Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 950, 987
(characterizing the constant dollar assumption as, in some measure, "heroic").
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Because it operated from within the efficiency paradigm, this criticism
differed fundamentally from the political and historical critiques.
Moreover, because it lacked an organizing principle, an economic
counter-vision of antitrust, it also differed from the later, more
coherent post-Chicago critique of Chicago's methodology.
For nearly a decade, the legal literature resounded with criticism
of Chicago, mostly from Modem Populist scholars.' As the 1980s
drew to a close, however, and the ascendancy of Chicago's approach
became increasingly apparent, the Populist criticism took on a frantic
tone,' and by the late 1980s the Populists spoke largely to them-
selves.' Not only could Chicagoans proclaim the dominance of their
"scientific" model, 6 they could point to opinions of the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts' and to Justice Department Merger
82. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 1, at 256; Louis Kaplow,
Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515,523-25 (1985).
83. A search of the legal literature reveals that between 1977 and 1987, Chicago's
leading Modem Populist critics-Professors Flynn, Fox, Pitofsky, Ponsoldt, and
Sullivan-wrote more than 30 articles challenging the Chicago School's approach to
antitrust. (Citations on file with the author).
84. See, eg., Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714,1715
(1986) ("Chicago is not fighting a war against inefficiency. Chicago is fighting a war for
private freedom of action."); Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 76, at 1136 ("[T]o define the
role of antitrust.., solely in terms of the neoclassical model would result in the abolition
of the antitrust laws.").
85. See, for example, the Symposia produced from the Airlie House Conference on
the Antitrust Alternative, published in 1987 by the Georgetown Law Journal, 76 GEo. L.J.
237, and the New York University Law Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 931, respectively. In
the introduction to the Georgetown issue, Professors Fox and Pitofsky note that, with the
exception of an essay by Judge Easterbrook, neither the Georgetown issue nor its N.Y.U.
companion included papers representative of Chicago thinking: "The need, we felt, was
not to reiterate the Chicago School's antitrust positions. It was, rather, to present an
antitrust alternative." Fox & Pitofsky, supra note 78, at 240.
86. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 972, 977-80 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court's opinion in Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), as a triumph of Chicago
reasoning: "The Court cited Robert Bork's work from beginning to end"; and suggesting
that antitrust courts become more scientific in their thinking: "[Courts must approach the
task of finding efficiency in the same way a social scientist would.") [hereinafter
Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct]. Chicago's claim to scientific neutrality
was vigorously contested by its Modern Populist critics. See, e.g., Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, supra note 5, at 1065 ("[A]ntitrust enforcement along economic lines
... incorporates large doses of hunch, faith, and intuition.").
87. See supra note 7 (citing applicable cases). See also Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1698-99 n.7 (listing numerous Supreme Court decisions
adopting the Chicago approach).
88. Some of these decisions were authored by Chicagoans themselves, see, e.g.,
Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987). But others were written by non-aligned
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Guidelines89 as evidence of its widespread acceptance. Though some
opponents continued to brand Chicagoans as apologists for Reagan
administration ideology,9" most scholars who disagreed with what
they regarded as Chicago's dismissive attitude towards the historical
and political values of antitrust grudgingly acknowledged the success,
if not the virtues, of the Chicago approach.9'
Observers attributed Chicago's success, and the concomitant
demise of the Modem Populist School, to a variety of factors. Some
credited the clarity of Chicago's model, stating that Chicagoans had
presented their theory to judges and policymakers "in ways that most
of them can easily understand."'  Some pointed to Chicago's
judges who had come to embrace Chicago's philosophy. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v.
ITI Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kaufman, J.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980).
89. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines-1982, reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,102 (June 14, 1982); U.S. Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines-1984, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103 (June 14,1984). Robert
Pitofsky, one of the Chicago School's foremost Modem Populist critics, has credited
"influential" Chicago scholarship for galvanizing intellectual and judicial support for the
expansive approach to market definition embodied in those Guidelines. See Robert
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1805, 1808 n.10 (1990). With small modifications, the 1984 Merger Guidelines have
been readopted by subsequent Justice Departments and continue in effect. See, e.g., U.S.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines-1992, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,104 (Apr. 7, 1992).
90. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. LJ. 321,321-22
(1987) (describing the Reagan administration's antitrust policy as "the most lenient
antitrust enforcement program in fifty years"; stating that with the exception of horizontal
cartels, large horizontal mergers, and predation, "antitrust has been consigned to a non-
enforcement oblivion"; and claiming that "[t]he basis for this extraordinary turnaround in
enforcement" is Chicago School theory).
91. See, e.g., Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust, supra note 10, at 1140 ("[R]egard
for efficiency is in the ascendancy."); Gerla, supra note 6, at 892 ("Classical microeconomic
theory (sometimes known as Chicago School Economics) has become the dominant tool
for contemporary antitrust analysis."); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics,
and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980)
(stating that "free access to markets and dealer independence have been rejected as
antitrust goals," as antitrust courts have become "expositors of applied microeconomic
policy").
Some argued that Chicago's perceived dominance was more illusory than real. See,
e.g., Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five Decisions in Search of a Theory, 1984
Sup. Cr. REv. 69,140 ("[A] majority of the Justices have knowingly rejected the consumer
welfare school of antitrust analysis in favor of something closer to the political content
approach."); Gordon B. Spivack, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises
of Monopoly Power: A Response, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 672 (1983) (characterizing
Chicago's claim that the Supreme Court has implemented its view of antitrust as "wishful
thinking").
92. Sullivan, supra note 91, at 9.
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capacity for promoting its work through self-referential scholarship. 3
Others believed that Chicago's dominance reflected an intellectual
and political backlash to the perceived antibusiness bias of the Warren
Court,94 while still others linked its ascendancy to the academic
veneer that it provided for the Reagan administration's conservative
economic policies.95 Scholars less critical of Chicago ascribed its
preeminence to substantive factors, noting that Chicago's price-theory
approach not only offered powerful efficiency explanations for many
business practices central to antitrust, but provided courts with
coherent, easily applied, and seemingly neutral decisional criteria.96
Though populist criticism of Chicago has not disappeared
altogether from academic journals,' the debate about the organizing
values of antitrust has lost its drama. Secure in the scientific nature
of their approach,9" Chicagoans have successfully weathered the
93. See, e.g., Eleanor Fox & Robert Pitofsky, The Antitrust Alternative: Introduction,
62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 931, 932 (1987) ("While the minimalists had one simple theory, and
generously cited one another in their scholarship and even in judicial opinions, the work
of the eclectics seemed scattered and unorganized.").
94. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 7, at 272 (observing that during the
1960s, "[t]he standards for judging an antitrust offense fell so low that respondents not
only made no affirmative case for economies as an antitrust defense but even disclaimed
economies that were ascribed to a merger by the government" (citing FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967))).
95. See, e.g., Thomas J. Campbell, The Antitrust Record of the First Reagan
Administration, 64 TEx. L. REv. 353, 354-55 (1985) (arguing that the Reagan ad-
ministration intentionally eased antitrust enforcement to shelter big business from
government intervention, accomplishing this objective through personnel changes and
funding reductions in federal enforcement agencies, efforts to amend antitrust legislation,
and the appointment to the federal bench of Chicago School adherents); William V.
Kovacic, Public Choice and the Public Interest: Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Enforcement During the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 467, 500 (1988)
(arguing that the Reagan administration eased the burdens of FTC enforcement upon the
business community); see also Ira M. Millstein & Jeffrey L. Kessler, The Antitrust Legacy
of the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRuST BULL. 505, 506-09 (1988) (arguing that the
Reagan administration tried to base its antitrust policy on economic theory rather than
factual analysis or legal precedent, and thereby persuaded the courts to continue and
accelerate their reliance upon economic analysis in antitrust cases).
96. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 1, at 217-18 (attributing the rise
of the Chicago School to a "change[] [in] economic models"); William H. Page, Ideological
Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 67 n.9 (1991) ("[T]he
Chicago School has gained judicial acceptance at the same time that parallel changes have
occurred in other areas of the law.").
97. For recent examples, see Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc.-Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 759 (1994)
[hereinafter Fox, Soul or Hook?]; Hughes, supra note 9.
98. "Economists pride themselves on being engaged in a scientific endeavor."
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 28, at 362. Judge Posner
apparently saw no irony in his claim, but observers with broader (or different) historical
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ideological criticism, partly by attacking the political biases of their
detractors99 and partly by citing the wide array of political views
among academic economists as evidence of the scientific neutrality of
the economic enterprise." As the normative criticism subsided,
disputes about seemingly technical economic questions moved to the
forefront of antitrust discourse 10 The issues occupying contem-
porary antitrust scholarship involve the extent to which new
theoretical work should modify the fundamental insights of price
theory."° The victory of a purely economic analysis over what
Robert Bork referred to as "the intellectual mush""l°s of the Modem
Populist School could hardly seem more complete. Having won the
perspectives have argued convincingly that every generation of antitrust economists has
proclaimed the scientific nature of its work, making the boundaries of the science flexible
enough to encompass a wide array of economic theory, some parts of which are
diametrically opposed to others. See, eg., James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in
the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-
1918, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 495, 563, 589-92 (1987).
99. See, e.g., BORK, THE ANTTrRusT PARADOX, supra note 41, at 422 (charging that
the populist antitrust vision of Chicago critics reflects a basic antagonism to the principle
of open markets and a preference for governmentally mandated equal outcomes).
According to Judge Posner, while the law and economics movement associated with the
Chicago School has been criticized frequently for its conservative ideological stance,
"economic research that provides support for liberal positions is rarely said to exhibit
political bias." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 26 (4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
100. See POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 28, at 435 n.16 ("As
for the suggestion that law and economics is inherently right-wing, this is both an error and
an affront to its liberal practitioners (Calabresi, Polinsky, Ackerman, Cooter, Kaplow,
Kornhauser, Donohue, others).").
101. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), best illustrates this phenomenon. See infra notes 138-43
and accompanying text.
102. For example, see the colloquy between Oliver Williamson, an economist-critic of
Chicago, and Frank Easterbrook, a notable Chicagoan, in Volume 76 of the Georgetown
Law Journal (1987). Responding to an earlier article by Easterbrook (The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984)) proposing various economic filters to simplify and
rationalize antitrust litigation, Williamson states, "My reservations with Easterbrook's
filters notwithstanding, I nonetheless am sympathetic to his main purpose... to develop
better criteria to distinguish good and bad cases." Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra
note 7, at 289. Replying to Williamson, Easterbrook agrees "wholeheartedly" that
"learning about strategic behavior is one of the most important programs for the future
of antitrust." Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, supra note 11, at
314.
103. E. William Barnett et al., Panel Discussion: Merger Enforcement and Practice, 50
ANTITRUST LJ. 233, 238 (1981). Attacking the populist alternative to the exclusively
economic approach, Bork observed that "if we are going to take into account all this vague
political rhetoric that many people find so attractive, not only is it questionable which way
the rhetoric leads, not only is it intellectual mush, but I think it makes [§ 7 of the Clayton
Act] unconstitutional," as an excessive delegation of Congressional power. Id.
239
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battle for the soul of antitrust, economists now vie largely against
each other, as contending schools of economic thought struggle "to
seize the scientific high ground.'
10 4
III. THE POST-CHICAGO CHALLENGE TO CHICAGO'S SUPREMACY
During the 1980s the field of economics known as industrial
organization reinvented itself. From its original focus on empirical
studies of industry structure, conduct, and performance, industrial
organization turned to the research and development of new theory
about the strategic behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive
markets. Broadly influenced by game theory-the study of profit-
maximizing strategic behavior in small groups of mutually dependent
rivals-much of that research was ground breaking." According to
some economists, during the past decade game theory has become
"the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists." '' c
As game theory achieved preeminent status in academic
economics, legal scholars came to apply its teachings to a variety of
disciplines,"°7 including antitrust where it now constitutes the major
alternative to the Chicago School. Over the past ten years, game
104. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1317 (1990)
(describing the current debate between Chicago and post-Chicago economists) [hereinafter
Ayres, Playing Games].
105. Although game theory first received attention in the' 1940s, see JOHN VON
NEUMANN & OSCAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
(1944), it has achieved prominence only in the past 20 years. Reporting on the award of
the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science to "three pioneers in the field of
game theory," The New York Times described the emergence of game theory over the past
two decades as "a sea of change in economics." Peter Passell, Game Theory Captures a
Nobel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994, at D1. The major theoretical developments in modem
industrial organization economics appear in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,
supra note 19, a two-volume compilation of essays by the world's leading industrial
organization economists. For a review summarizing these developments and placing them
in historical and theoretical perspective, see Robert H. Porter, A Review Essay on
Handbook of Industrial Organization, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 553 (1991).
106. Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND
J. ECON. 113, 113 (1989). For a comprehensive guide to the development, practice, and
vocabulary of game theory, see ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1989); for an informative overview of the application
of game theory to business problems, see AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF,
THINKING STRATEGICALLY (1991). Many intermediate economics textbooks also provide
good introductions to concepts and problems germane to game theory. See, e.g., ROBERT
S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 453-90 (3d ed. 1995).
107. For an especially clear exposition of the fundamentals of game theory and its
application to a wide variety of legal issues, as well as an extensive bibliography of legal
scholarship dealing with game theory, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW (1994).
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theorists have offered new theoretical accounts of the efficiency
effects and market dynamics underlying vertical restraints,"8
oligopoly,09 mergers,"' and predatory pricing,"' providing in
each case one or more anticompetitive explanations for behavior
regarded by Chicago scholars as unambiguously efficient. They have
suggested strategic models"' for evaluating the potential efficacy
and durability of collusive behavior."' And they have proposed
broader measures for assessing market power, the critical factor in
antitrust litigation"---measures that would modify Chicago's heavy
emphasis on market share"5 by considering strategic factors that
108. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209,224 (1986); Richard
Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitru=" A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX.
L. REv. 41, 64 (1984).
109. See, eg., Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 19, at 269, 330.
110. See, ag., Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, supra note 25.
111. Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust" The Case of
Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1625,1636-74 (1987); William S. Comanor & H.E.
Frech III, Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 293, 294-97
(1993); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL
STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112, 112-37 (Giacomo Bonanno &
Dario Brandolini eds., 1990); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 19, at 537.
112. "Strategic behavior arises when two or more individuals interact and each
individual's decision turns on what that individual expects the other to do." BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 107, at 1. Because parties usually possess less than perfect information about
the decisional processes of those with whom they interact, expectations about the future
decisions of others usually contain some degree of uncertainty; indeed, incomplete
information is said to be "the central problem in game theory and the law." Id. at 2.
113. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish. A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing
Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987).
114. For a general discussion of market power, see George A. Hay, Market Power in
Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807 (1992). Hay states that "[t]he concept of market power
is at the core of antitrust." Ld. at 807.
115. Chicago's basic approach to measuring market power has been summarized as
follows: "[T]he standard method of proving market power in antitrust cases involves first
defining a relevant [product and geographic] market in which to compute the defendant's
market share,... and then deciding whether it is large enough to support an inference of
the required degree of market power." Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 938.
Chicagoans acknowledge problems with this approach, id. at 939-52, and have expanded
it to allow the absence of entry barriers to offset high market share, see Ball Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,
J.) (stating that high share in market for health insurance is not indicative of market
power, because "[n]ew firms may enter easily... [since] insurers need only a license and
capital ... [and the existing firms] do not own any assets that block or delay entry").
They nevertheless justify its continued use on prudential grounds. See, e.g., Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 17, at 22.
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may confer leverage on smaller firms.116
Despite their differences, post-Chicago and Chicago scholars
share a common metric. They agree that wealth maximization should
be the exclusive goal of antitrust policy, and antitrust enforcement
should strive to achieve the highest practicable level of consumer
welfare." 7  They eschew the multivalent inquiries informing the
Modem Populists' approach in favor of the single-minded pursuit of
allocative efficiency. Their debate, it seems, revolves around technical
disagreement over the role of market imperfections in shaping
antitrust policy and the enforcement methodology most conducive to
consumer welfare.
Unlike Chicago scholars, post-Chicagoans refuse to assume that
markets function perfectly."' They start from the premise that
because the marginal cost of additional information is positive, firms
will rarely acquire complete information about their markets, rivals,
and options."' In addition, they posit that because different firms
in the same or related markets will rarely assign identical value to the
acquisition of additional information or acquire new information at
precisely the same time, their informational holdings will rarely be
116. See Baker, supra note 14, at 655; Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 20, at 5-15;
Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 1,
4-11 (1993).
117. According to one post-Chicago scholar, the new developments in antitrust
economics "demonstrate that we need not reject the value of economic efficiency in order
to question the Chicago School. These challenges to Chicago arise from within the
efficiency paradigm." Baker, supra note 14, at 646.
118. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 82, at 536-37 ("Markets do not always function in
accordance with the textbook model of perfect competition, and the economic analysis of
any situation must be adjusted accordingly. In fact, the whole of antitrust concerns the
study of imperfect markets."). Scholars applying principles of game theory to antitrust
analysis are not the only ones to criticize Chicago's insistence on the perfect-market
assumption. See, e.g., Michael E. DeBow, Markets, Government Intervention, and the Role
of Information: An "Austrian School" Perspective, with an Application to Merger
Regulation, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 31, 55 (1991) (criticizing the perfect-market
assumption as an unrealistic snapshot of an end-state that ignores the dynamic features of
competition). Other scholars have argued that the law and economics movement suffers
generally from its failure to incorporate other disciplines, notably sociology and
psychology, into its jurisprudence. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and
Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 23, 25-35 (1989); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 470-74 (1974).
119. See, eg., David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information,
27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 256, 276-77 (1982); Garth Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and
Incomplete Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165, 167 n.7 (1987).
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symmetrical."2 The Chicago School acknowledges the existence of
informational and other market imperfections,' but argues that
judicial consideration of those imperfections would confuse and
complicate antitrust theory without adding to its predictability or
coherence."z  In the view of post-Chicagoans, however, these
informational asymmetries tend to persist, rather than dissolve, thus
enabling well-informed firms-even relatively small ones-to take
advantage of less informed rivals and trading partners.' 3 Other
market imperfections, such as sunk costs, are equally durable in their
view, and equally corrosive of competitive conditions.24
Their emphasis on market failures has led post-Chicago theorists
to find anticompetitive potential in business behavior that Chicagoans
regard as benign. In at least four areas of acute interest to antitrust
policymakers, post-Chicago scholarship has explored the efficiency
justifications offered by Chicago and found them wanting. In each of
these areas-predatory pricing, vertical contracting restraints, tie-ins,
and vertical mergers-post-Chicago game theory provides new
answers to questions that Chicagoans have long regarded as settled.
Chicago scholars have consistently contended that predatory
pricing is almost always economically irrational for the putative
predator. It can succeed, on their view, only if the structure of the
predator's market-in particular, the barriers to post-predation
120. See generally Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, Strategic Business Behavior
and Antitrust, in ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY 39 (Robert J. Lamer & James W.
Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989) (discussing the antitrust implications of new theories about
industrial organization).
121. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171 (1968); Richard
A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 304
(1979) (describing economic models that contemplate imperfect competition and imperfect
information). Indeed, informational imperfections, and their disruptive effect on
competitive equilibrium, received the attention of economists and legal scholars before the
post-Chicago School emerged. See, eg., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 630 (1979); J.E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect
Information, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 339,339-40 (1979). This earlier work, however, did not
form the core of a unified theory of antitrust.
122. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 99, at 17; Easterbrook,
Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1706 ("what's wrong with models that contain
'unrealistic' assumptions? The purpose of any model is to strip away complications, to
make things simple enough that we can see how particular variations matter.").
123. See, eg., Baker, supra note 14, at 646.
124. Id. at 651-52; Steven C. Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551,
557, 562 (1986).
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entry-enable the predator to recoup its losses.125 By contrast, post-
Chicago theorists argue that information gaps frequently make price
predation a profitable strategy, and that a predator's reputation for
irrational conduct can prove profitable, regardless of market struc-
ture."z Post-Chicagoans have also challenged Chicago's thesis that
long-term exclusive contracts not only maximize the contracting
parties' profits but also promote social welfare. 27 In their view,
strategically conceived exclusive contracts can diminish social welfare,
even while enhancing private gain."
Post-Chicagoans disagree with Chicago's position on tying
arrangements and vertical mergers. Before the birth of the Chicago
School, the "leverage theory" provided the dominant framework for
analyzing tying agreements. Under that theory, tie-ins enabled a firm
with monopoly power in one market to use that power to foreclose
sales, and thus monopolize, a second market. 29 Chicagoans at-
tacked the leverage theory-in their words, they "demolished"
it 3 0-- by demonstrating that tie-ins produced economic effects that
were either beneficial or inconsequential, and were thus undeserving
125. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, supra note 23, at 268-
69. The Supreme Court has largely accepted Chicago's view. See Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2587 (1993) (focusing analysis of
predatory pricing claims on market structure: number of firms, ease of entry, likelihood
of recoupment); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986)
(same); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585, 588 n.9
(1986) (same).
126. In particular, post-Chicagoans have theorized that, by creating a reputation for
irrational pricing behavior, a would-be predator can cause inexperienced rivals to fear that
if they compete strongly against the irrational firm they will become the target of
predatory activity, inducing them to temper their competitive vigor. See, e.g., Baker, supra
note 14, at 648-49; Campbell, supra note 111, at 1640-55; Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE
L.J. 8, 15-21 (1981) (discussing various strategies).
127. The Chicago view is set forth in BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 41,
at 138-42, 262, 304, 309, and in POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 22, at 203-04.
128. See, e.g., Brodley & Ma, supra note 22, at 1163 (using game theoretic analysis to
argue that, contrary to Chicago theory, in certain carefully defined monopoly markets
long-term exclusive dealing contracts can directly lead to "reduced output, diminished
return to innovation and new entry, and enhanced profit for the monopolist").
129. See, e.g., Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 837, 837 (1990).
130. BORK, THE ANTrTRUST PARADOX, supra note 41, at 372 ("[The leverage] theory
... is merely another example of the discredited transfer-of-power theory, and perhaps no
other variety of that theory has been so thoroughly and repeatedly demolished in the legal
and economic literature.").
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of antitrust scrutiny.'3' Post-Chicagoans have resuscitated the
leverage theory, arguing that market imperfections, such as sunk costs
and network externalities,'32 can make tying a profitable anticom-
petitive strategy.'33 Similarly, they have reexamined Chicago's
notion that vertical mergers pose no threat to competition,'3
concluding that such mergers "can be used to achieve anticompetitive
foreclosure of downstream firms from an essential source of sup-
ply.
135
Other important differences divide these schools. As noted
above, post-Chicagoans define market power more expansively than
their Chicago counterparts. 3 6  They also tend to be less sanguine
131. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and
Antitrust Policy, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1978); Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
132. Network externalities are the benefits realized by or available to consumers of
goods that are interchangeable or technologically compatible-by standardized interface,
for example-with a relatively large number of complementary goods or services.
Technology requiring specific training is particularly subject to network externalities: The
more widely adopted the associated technology, the more valuable the training. Post-
Chicagoans theorize that "the dynamics of industries subject to network externalities are
fundamentally different from those of conventional industries"; and specifically that
"technology that is superior today has a strategic, first-mover advantage: it can become
locked in as the standard." See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in
the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 823-25 (1986). See generally
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 404-09 (1988) (giving an
account of the recent developments in, and the traditions of, industrial organization).
133. Whinston, supra note 129, at 855.
134. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 22, at 171-84, 196-207 (1976); RICHARD
A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 869-76 (2d ed. 1981).
135. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, supra note 25, at 140; see also
Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 1988 Q.J. ECON. 345,354-55
(concluding that, while under some circumstances a vertical merger may cause the price
of the intermediate good to increase, a vertical merger does not necessarily result in
market foreclosure of unintegrated products).
136. See supra notes 118-35 and accompanying text. The Chicago view of market
power is set forth, among other places, in PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 340 (4th ed. 1988). Examples of the broader, post-Chicago view
include Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price
Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REv. 815 (1992), and Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the
Presence of an Installed Base, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1993). The First Circuit Court of
Appeals has expressed the view that "no subject in antitrust law [is] more confusing than
market definition" because in applying the concept, lawyers and judges impose on it
"nuances and formulas that reflect administrative and antitrust policy goals," intertwining
"normative and descriptive ideas." U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d
589, 598 (1st Cir. 1993); accord SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965-66
(10th Cir. 1994) (quoting the above-quoted text from U.S. Healthcare).
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about the frequency and longevity of collusive behavior. 3 7 Conse-
quently, despite a shared allegiance to the efficiency metric, the post-
Chicago and Chicago Schools approach the major issues in antitrust
from markedly different directions. Most significantly, the emergence
of post-Chicago theory has demonstrated that the economic model is
not orthodox: It can and does yield divergent answers to the most
important questions about the efficiency effects of business behavior
and government intervention.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Ina'38 bears compelling
witness to the growing acceptance of the post-Chicago perspective.
Faced with a tie-in claim that Chicago's price-theoretic approach
would have rejected,'39 the Kodak Court embraced the post-Chicago
thesis that market imperfections-specifically information gaps and
high switching costs--can confer power on small firms in ostensibly
competitive markets and thus enable them to put tying arrangements
137. See, eg., Baker, supra note 14, at 649-50 ("Chicago-oriented antitrusters tend to
interpret an industry price war as demonstrating the inherent difficulty of enforcing
collusion in that industry. But new economic models demonstrate that occasional
competitive episodes are not inconsistent with long periods of collusive pricing.").
138. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). Plaintiffs in Kodak, independent service organizations (ISOs)
that repaired and maintained Kodak copying and micrographic equipment, alleged that
Kodak violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by unlawfully tying the sale of service to
the sale of replacement parts and by monopolizing and attempting to monopolize the
service market for Kodak equipment. Id. at 456. According to the ISOs, after obtaining
control over the supply of Kodak brand replacement parts-the only brand that would
work with its equipment-Kodak refused to sell parts to equipment owners who employed
the ISOs, effectively driving ISOs from the market. Id. at 458. The District Court granted
Kodak summary judgment on both counts of the complaint. Image Technical Servs., Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,402, at 60,210, 60,211-60,214 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 18, 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), affid, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that despite Kodak's conceded
lack of power in the primary equipment markets, the possibility of "market imperfections"
raised a factual question as to whether Kodak possessed sufficient power in replacement
parts to force some customers to purchase service from Kodak. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612,616-18 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
139. In both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, Kodak argued that the dictates
of neoclassical price theory, coupled with the concession that Kodak's primary equipment
market was competitive, precluded it from possessing power in the after-market for Kodak
parts. Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 616. Price theory teaches that equipment buyers
would regard a rise in the price of parts as an increase in the overall price of the
equipment; in Kodak's concededly competitive equipment market, a unilateral price
increase would lead to lost revenues. Because "market power" whose exercise reduces
profitability is not market power at all, Kodak claimed that it could not have violated the
antitrust laws. See id. at 616; Kodak, 504 U.S. at 465-66. Judge Bork, among others,
strongly agreed with Kodak's argument. See BORK, THE ANTTRUST PARADOX, supra
note 41, at 436-39.
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to anticompetitive use."4  Antitrust scholars, Chicago and post-
Chicago alike, view Kodak as a jurisprudential milestone 4' and a
victory for post-Chicago thought.'42 Some believe it indicates that
post-Chicago theory may supplant Chicago's approach as the
dominant method of antitrust analysis.'43
The post-Chicago focus on market imperfections demands an
enforcement methodology more complicated than Chicago's."
140. The Kodak Court indicated that while Kodak's argument was "intuitively
appealing," price theory "may not accurately explain the behavior of primary and
derivative markets for complex durable goods." Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473. In such markets,
said the Court, "difficult and costly" information gaps and "high switching costs" can
confer market power on sellers with relatively low market shares. Id at 473-78. The
Court's focus on information gaps and switching costs-market imperfections consciously
ignored by Chicago theorists-prompted post-Chicago scholars to declare that the Kodak
analysis was "post-Chicago." Interview with Professor Salop, supra note 16, at 21;
Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 603 (1994) ("In Kodak, the Court embraced post-Chicago economic
arguments.").
141. In prior years, facts comparable to those alleged in Kodak-a big firm harms
smaller competitors by abusing the competitive process and breaking from behavior
patterns that had encouraged the entry and growth of smaller firms-would arguably have
caused at least some members of the Court to see Kodak through the socio-political lens
of the Modern Populists. See Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect
Information: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, 52 MD. L. REv. 336, 361-62 (1993). The total absence of the Modern Populist
view from Kodak's discussion makes manifest the analytical dominance of exclusively
economic models. Id. at 363.
A prominent Modern Populist scholar interprets Kodak differently. See Fox, Soul or
Hook?, supra note 97, at 760 (reading Kodak as a "chink in the armor of the allocative
efficiency model" and as a reaffirmation of the "legitimacy and process values of
antitrust").
142. See, e.g., Lawrence T. Festa III, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc. The Decline and Fall of the Chicago Empire?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 619, 620
(1993); Jacobs, supra note 141, at 355-56; Robert Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin:
Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTnTRuST
L.J. 193, 193 (1993) [hereinafter Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin]; Salop, supra note
24, at 4; Lisa M. Judson, Note, Kodak v. Image Technical Serices: The Taming of
Matsushita and the Chicago School, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1633, 1635; Ronald S. Katz & Janet
S. Arnold, Eastman Kodak v. ITS: The Downfall of the Chicago School, 9 COMPUTER
LAW., July 1992, at 1, 1. Without expressly acknowledging the Kodak Court's adoption
of post-Chicago theory, Robert Bork attacked the majority's reasoning, charging that "it
is capable of driving rational economic analysis once more from the law." BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 41, at 438.
143. See, e.g., Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin, supra note 142, at 197 ("Kodak thus
dramatically crystallizes many of the differences between Chicago School and post-Chicago
School antitrust analysis and suggests that... the post-Chicago School has the opportunity
to advance.").
144. Antitrust scholars agree on this point. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra
note 1, at 261 ("The static market fallacy and the failure of orthodox Chicago School
antitrust policy to take strategic behavior seriously are closely related weaknesses in the
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Alleged market imperfections must be identified and evaluated for
commercial significance. 45  Markets that appear competitive-by
virtue, for example, of their relatively large number of small
firms-may nevertheless warrant antitrust scrutiny if information gaps
or other imperfections can arguably convey power on one or more
firms." In addition, rather than alter structural conditions,
remedies under post-Chicago process must ameliorate the effects of
the relevant market imperfections, either by repairing the imperfec-
tions directly or preventing firms from taking unfair advantage of
them. Collectively, these features result in a complex and costly
enforcement methodology, but one whose cost and complexity are
implicitly justified, in the view of post-Chicagoans, by a heightened
sensitivity to market dynamics and the promotion of efficiency.147
Of course, Chicago scholars are acutely aware of these
methodological complexities, and have criticized proposed applications
of post-Chicago theory as administratively unworkable. 4 Even
scholars more sympathetic to strategic models acknowledge the
market efficiency model."). In this respect post-Chicago methodology shares the
difficulties of its intellectual predecessor, the industrial organization economics of the
1950s. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis,
87 YALE L.. 1, 29 (1977) (describing the model of entry barriers proposed by the Harvard
scholar and Industrial Organization economist Joe Bain, and concluding that "there is no
way the judicial process can handle concepts of this complexity and indeterminacy").
145. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 141, at 369-71.
146. See, eg., Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and
Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 61 (1994) ("After Kodak, courts must
also consider nonstructural market power with no guidance as to how this should be done.
Both the expansion of antitrust and the uncertainty as to its extent will greatly increase
antitrust's costs of administration.").
147. The cost and complexity of this methodology are justified only "implicitly"
because, despite the outpouring of literature on antitrust game theory and its application,
post-Chicagoans have yet to formulate a precise description of their enforcement
methodology or explain how or why it might differ from the presumptively simpler
approach of the Chicago School. Thus, while Chicago scholars have criticized the cost and
complexity of post-Chicago enforcement by imagining or inferring its complications, post-
Chicagoans themselves have yet to elaborate or defend their process; and some post-
Chicagoans have themselves questioned the applicability of strategic models to antitrust
enforcement. See, e.g., Interview with Dennis A. Yao, Former FTC Commissioner, 9
ANTITRUST, Fall 1994, at 12, 16 ("Game-theoretic models generally become unwieldy
unless they adopt restrictive assumptions, and these restrictive assumptions may not be
descriptive of reality.").
148. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 1, at 261 (stating that factual
issues central to post-Chicago theory "are too complex to be dealt with in antitrust
litigation"); see also Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1701, 1709-
12 (stating that the "development of complex models is one thing, [but] proof of their
utility is another," and recognizing that "[e]very thoughtful scholar in antitrust works on
these problems").
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problems in developing related enforcement mechanisms.49 Other
scholars have observed that many of the competitively harmful effects
identified by post-Chicago game theory arise from business practices
that are equally likely, ex ante, to generate efficiency benefitsY °
According to these scholars, courts faced with claims of anticom-
petitive strategic behavior confront an intractable problem. Because
no economically meaningful test can distinguish strategic from
efficiency motives ex ante, and because proof of an efficiency
motivation is a defense under rule of reason analysis,"' "credible
efficiency defenses will exist whenever a strategic claim can be
made."'52  On their view, until game theorists devise criteria for
differentiating harmful strategies from efficient ones, post-Chicago
methodology will remain impracticable and indeterminate. 53
Moreover, although Chicagoans usually refrain from scrutinizing
product and service markets for competitively meaningful imperfec-
tions, imperfections in the market for antitrust enforcement attract
their undivided attention.Y Chicago adherents emphasize the
complexity and ambiguity of economic evidence, as well as the
limitations of the trial process,' 5  and contend that these imperfec-
tions often prevent the judiciary from understanding the welfare
implications of most business conduct. 6  This inevitably imperfect
149. See, e.g., Ayres, Playing Games, supra note 104, at 1317; Hovenkamp, After
Chicago, supra note 1, at 261.
150. Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551, 589 (1991); see also Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1710 (arguing that although raising rivals' costs is a form
of exclusionary conduct, it may also control wasteful investments).
151. Antitrust analysis under the Rule of Reason "includes an efficiency defense."
Brodley & Ma, supra note 22, at 1204; see also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (stating that "otherwise unob-
tainable efficiencies" can justify an arrangement that, in their absence, would violate the
antitrust laws; quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 365
(1962) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
152. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 150, at 591.
153. Id. at 596.
154. Judge Easterbrook has been the most prolific Chicagoan on this point. See, eg.,
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 17, at 6; Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust
Policy, supra note 65, at 1706; Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks,
supra note 11, at 307 ("Litigation produces false positives and false negatives. The more
complex or unusual the conduct, the more false positives and false negatives there will be.
In other words, the greater the complexity, the greater the error rate.").
155. See Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 86, at 976 ("The
process of litigation.., does not hold out much promise for finding economic truth.").
156. "The welfare implications of most forms of business conduct are beyond our ken."
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 17, at 11.
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decisional process, Chicagoans conclude, should make judges wary of
condemning arguably uncompetitive practices, lest they mistakenly
proscribe arrangements that would otherwise contribute to social
welfare.
15 7
In some ways the differences between Chicago's simple, low-cost
enforcement methodology and post-Chicago's more complicated
models reflect their differing approaches to market imperfections. In
an important sense, however, these methodological differences
embody conflicting notions about the efficacy of government
intervention in private markets and the judicial capacity to understand
economic data and argument. Above all, however, the sharp
procedural and substantive contrasts between the Chicago and post-
Chicago Schools demonstrate the heterogeneity within the exclusively
economic approach to antitrust. Between them, the competing
schools encompass widely divergent opinions about both the efficiency
effects of business behavior and the means most appropriate to the
efficiency goal.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STALEMATE IN ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
Scholarly criticism has exposed weaknesses in both schools of
economics, but done little to resolve their debate. Predictably, post-
Chicago writers fault Chicagoans for discounting the role of market
imperfections in antitrust analysis, while Chicagoans insist that post-
Chicago methodology is unworkable.' Each school claims a more
accurate vision of the marketplace and a more effective enforcement
policy, and each promotes its vision as the linchpin of competition
law. Chicago's streamlined methodology rests on an optimistic vision
of the market and a pessimistic view of the judiciary's ability to cope
with complex economic data. Post-Chicago sees competition as more
fragile, market imperfections as more destructive, and the judicial
process as more capable-all of which, in its opinion, warrant a more
probing enforcement policy.
Of course, courts and policymakers need not choose in every case
between the competing models. Since both schools aspire to
157. IcL at 2. According to Chicagoans, the problems wrought by an overly aggressive
judiciary are manifold. In addition to the permanent social losses caused by the potentially
wrongful condemnation of efficient business practices, other factors-such as the high costs
of suit, the cautionary lesson of stare decisis, and the disinclination of litigants to argue
openly for the reversal of inefficient rules-tend to provide mistaken decisions with
unfortunately long life spans. IkL at 2-4.
158. See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
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maximize consumer welfare, they sometimes reach the same
conclusion about particular business practices. As shown above,
however, and as Kodak demonstrates, in many important areas the
Chicago and post-Chicago approaches yield significantly different
results.'59 In these areas, the opposing views of the two schools
require courts and policymakers to choose between them. Both
schools agree, though, that the state of empirical economic evidence
is neither sufficiently developed nor sufficiently clear to provide an
adequate basis for making the choice.
Though Chicago scholars occasionally claim that their model rests
on solid empirical footing,"6 they are quick to admit that even
simple economic inquiries "often yield ambiguous answers,"'' and
to acknowledge the inadequacy of the data informing their theory.'62
They defend their model chiefly on the ground that simple but
realistic assumptions imbue it with substantial explanatory power.'6
Almost all these assumptions, however, are contestable."6 Many
are counterfactual-that is, their verification requires the evaluation
159. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
160. See, ag., Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1699 & nn.8-9.
161. 1d. at 1712. In evident agreement, one federal appeals court has noted that "[a]s
a social science built on assumptions and statistics, economics is subject to the
disparagement attributed by Mark Twain in his autobiography to Benjamin Disraeli:
'There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.' " McGahee v. Northern
Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 n.19 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1094
(1989).
162. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, supra note 11,
at 308-09 (announcing that "[t]he empirical foundation on which much antitrust policy was
built has been washed away," and implying that nothing had been erected in its place);
Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 86, at 975.
163. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 99, at 17 ("Judged by the test
of explanatory power, economic theory is a significant (though only partial) success; so
perhaps the assumption that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions is not so
unrealistic."); Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1706 ("Any
approach to antitrust must simplify; modeling is essential; the best approach is the simplest
one that can cope with the data.").
164. See, e.g., Eddie Correia, Antitrust Policy After the Reagan Administration, 76 GEo.
L.J. 329, 331 (1987) (claiming that the empirical evidence for "the most fundamental
assumptions" underlying Chicago policy are "often very thin"). The Chicago School has
generated a substantial body of empirical work, much of which deals with the relationship
between concentration and market performance. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.. 135, 151 n.31 (1983). Most
scholars agree, however, that this research "do[es] not resolve many of the most basic
empirical questions" associated with the Chicago model. William H. Page, The Chicago
School and the Evolution of Antitrust" Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary
Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1242 (1989) [hereinafter Page, Evolution of Antitrust].
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of facts which do not or cannot appear in real markets-and thus defy
any systematic testing efforts.
Take, for example, Judge Easterbrook's oft-cited argument for a
cautious policy of antitrust enforcement, an argument that lies at the
heart of the Chicago model:
[U]ntil we know what a durable business practice does, no
one should prohibit the use of that practice. The costs of
erroneous prohibitions ... are apt to be greater than the
losses involved in waiting for better data and analysis before
acting.6'
Perhaps Judge Easterbrook is correct. Maybe the costs of judicial
error exceed the losses entailed in tolerating "durable" practices until
we understand them better. But maybe not. The answer depends in
part on whether "erroneous" prohibitions can be accurately identified.
It depends as well upon whether one can measure with rough
accuracy the frequency of such prohibitions, the magnitude of the
benefits mistakenly forgone, and the positive external effects
produced by erroneous prohibitions, including the incentives created
by aggressive enforcement policy for the development of more
efficient, noncontroversial business practices. No data exist on these
points, though, nor is it likely that any can be gathered. Moreover,
the answer demands a comparison of the relative efficiency effects of
cautious and interventionist enforcement models, models that cannot
exist simultaneously and therefore cannot be properly compared.
The same charge can be leveled against other tenets of Chicago
philosophy. As Professor Page has pointed out, Chicago's view that
resale price maintenance eliminates free-riding and enhances output
remains a matter of intense and voluminous academic debate,
166
largely because "[t]he state of empirical research in the area is
inadequate to resolve the dispute."1 67  Similarly, despite their
expressions of concern for efficiency, Chicagoans have rejected
efficiency-based defenses in merger and joint venture cases, partly
165. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1701.
166. See, eg., Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle
and Antitrust Method, 80 VA. L. REV. 577, 579 (1994) ("The subject of vertical restraints
probably rivals all other antitrust subjects combined in the volume of commentary it has
inspired.").
167. Page, Evolution of Antitrust, supra note 164, at 1252. Some have attempted to
challenge the empirical underpinning of Chicago's view, but the "data" contained in these
attempts has been largely anecdotal. See, e.g., Robert L. Steiner, Manufacturers'
Promotional Allowances, Free Riders, and Vertical Restraints, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 383,
388 (1991).
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because they believe that no data exist on efficiencies generated by
these arrangements, and partly because they worry the problems of
measuring putative efficiencies would seriously burden the litigation
process.'8
The factual basis of post-Chicago theory is no stronger. One of
the most important post-Chicago models is the "raising rivals' costs"
thesis, which postulates that under certain conditions, strategizing
firms can monopolize their markets by entering exclusionary supply
contracts that raise the costs of their rivals' inputs. 69 This thesis has
been questioned on empirical grounds, both by Chicagoans claiming
that it fails to differentiate between efficient and anticompetitive
contracting practices,17 and by centrist scholars asking whether and
how often anticompetitive exclusion actually occurs. 7' Post-Chicago
theses regarding the anticompetitive potential of contractual
provisions for liquidated damages have attracted similar criticism.'
168. See, eg., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis
of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282, 313 (1975) ("Rebuttal based on ease of entry, economies of scale,
or managerial efficiencies should not be allowed, because these factors, although clearly
relevant to a correct evaluation of the competitive significance of a merger, are intractable
subjects for litigation."). While agreeing that "[m]ost efficiencies are exceptionally difficult
to measure," Professor Pitofsky finds it "surprising" that Chicagoans would reject an
efficiency defense in merger cases-especially in light of their claim that the Warren Court
was "insufficiently sensitive" to efficiency arguments-and suggests that Chicago's position
stems in part from the view that an efficiencies defense "would justify more vigorous
general antitrust enforcement" and thus undermine Chicago's "conservative approach."
Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global
Economy, 81 GEO. LJ. 195, 209-10 (1992).
169. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 108, at 234. Literature based on this thesis
is widespread. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the
Market for Exclusionary Rights, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1293 n.2 (1987).
170. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 150, at 591.
171. Hovenkamp, supra note 169, at 1297 ("[M]any things are not known about the
strategies of raising rivals' costs, including whether and how often firms employ such
strategies, whether and when the strategies are anticompetitive, and how courts can
identify when the strategies are being employed anticompetitively.").
172. Post-Chicago economists argue that when monopolists and their customers are
perfectly uncertain about future entry into the monopolists' market, both groups can
maximize profits by executing long-term supply contracts requiring the customer to pay
exorbitant liquidated damages should it switch suppliers during the contract term. Though
privately profitable, these contracts are socially inefficient, since they discourage more
efficient firms from entering the monopolist's market and extract economic rents from
those few firms that do enter. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 22, at 388-404. Post-Chicago
legal scholars claim that these penalty contracts constitute commercially important
transactions that merit aggressive antitrust scrutiny. Brodley & Ma, supra note 22, at 1177.
Critics, however, note that "[s]tudies scrutinizing contracts for strategic effect ... are
relatively scarce"; that reported cases involving anticompetitive penalty provisions are rare;
and that in those cases, the contractual provisions had sound efficiency rationales. Scott
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The post-Chicago School is new. Much of its work consists of
developing possibility theorems that refute the conclusions reached
with price theoretic models.73 It has generated so many theorems
so quickly that there has been insufficient time to test them all. 4
Moreover, many post-Chicago theories are constructed so restric-
tively-modeled, for example, on simple market structures or single-
period games-that testing them is unproductive. 5  Others depend
on speculation about the reputational effects of apparently irrational
strategic behavior-predatory pricing, for example176-- making
empirical validation impossible.'" This is not to say that post-
Chicago theory ignores problems of measurement. In some areas,
notably the study of market power in concentrated industries, post-
Chicago scholars have created new empirical tools. 78 But despite
that progress, post-Chicagoans concede that many of their theories
have not been verified. 79
E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, The Design and Duration of Contracts: Strategic and
Efficiency Considerations, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 63, 74, 84 (1989).
173. According to the economist Franklin Fisher, a possibility theorem, also called an
exemplifying theory,
does not tell us what must happen. Rather it tells us what can happen .... When
well handled, exemplifying theory can be very illuminating indeed, suggestively
revealing the possibility of cgrtain phenomena. What such theory lacks, of
course, is generality. The very stripping down of the model that makes it easy
(or even possible) to see what is going on also prevents us from knowing how the
results will stand up in more general settings.
Fisher, supra note 106, at 117-18.
174. For example, the application of game theory to the study of oligopoly has
generated a large number of postulates about how oligopolists are likely to choose the
joint-maximizing solution. According to one prominent economist, "A great many
outcomes are known to be possible.... [w]ith outcomes depending on what variables the
oligopolists use [to predict one another's behavior] and how they form conjectures about
each other." Id. at 117.
175. See, e.g., Snyder & Kauper, supra note 150, at 565.
176. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 14, at 649 ("When a firm predates against a few rivals
it can create a reputation for irrationality. Other rivals who have not experienced
predatory competition will now reasonably fear that if they compete strongly with the
crazy firm, it will turn and predate against them. So they back off.").
177. Porter, supra note 105, at 561.
178. See, e.g., Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 20, at 3-13 (describing new econometric
techniques); Timothy F. Bresnahan & Richard Schmalensee, The Empirical Renaissance
in Industrial Economics, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 371, 374-76 (1987).
179. See, e.g., Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Noncooperative Game Theory for
Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION, supra note 19, at 259, 323 ("[C]urrent refinements have not yet been
tested for a wide class of models."); Shapiro, supra note 109, at 409 ("What we are most
in need of now are further tests of the empirical validity of these various theories of
strategic behavior.").
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Consequently, though each school can marshal some empirical
support for its position, neither can legitimately claim that the
economic evidence resolves the debate in its favor. Economists still
know little about the efficiency consequences of most business
practices, the effects of firm size on competitive vitality, or the ability
of courts to distinguish between harmful and beneficial behavior.
Further, as to at least some of these matters, such as those calling for
counter-factual comparisons, reliable data may be impossible to
gather. From the scientific and rhetorical perspectives, this absence
of data prevents each school from disproving the other's theory. °
From a practical perspective, the inconclusive state of the economic
evidence precludes policymakers from accurately comparing the
relative merits of Chicago and post-Chicago theory on efficiency
grounds.
Some scholars have advocated the use of cost-benefit analysis to
break the deadlock between the two theories. While acknowledging
that assertions about market efficiency and judicial competence are
grounded more in intuition than empiricism, these scholars never-
theless contend that policymakers should accept certain assertions on
faith. Because they regard the econometric measures needed to test
the efficiency effects of market behaviors and judicial opinions as
"expensive as well as potentially indeterminate,"'8 1 these writers
claim that antitrust litigation should forgo factual investigation of
those effects."8  Rather, they contend, the irresolvable empirical
uncertainty about the workings of markets and courts argues for a
streamlined model of antitrust enforcement, a methodology that
would minimize the sum of error and process costs associated with
government intervention.'13
This argument possesses a certain superficial appeal. Antitrust
economists regularly consider the effects of transaction costs on
180. From a philosophical perspective, sizeable amounts of additional data might not
end the debate. Data is never fully self-explanatory; and if, as this Essay argues, the
formation of economic theory depends in important measure on the theorists' ideological
biases, the interpretation of economic evidence may also be subject to ideological bias.
181. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 86, at 979.
182. Id at 977-78.
183. Id. at 977. A variant of this view, based on the economic theory of the so-called
Austrian School, argues that because government is generally less effective than the
private sector at gathering accurate information about the market, courts should refrain
from intervening in allegedly anticompetitive markets "whenever a cost-benefit analysis
of the [proposed] intervention is either not possible or not reliable." DeBow, supra note
118, at 80.
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consumer welfare,"8 and would almost certainly agree that, all
things being equal, decisionmakers should choose the least costly
enforcement model. Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly
recognized the high cost and uncertainty of antitrust litigation,
particularly the judiciary's limitations in coping with complex
economic evidence,"s and it has repeatedly emphasized that "[t]he
administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually
compelling."' 6 The inability of the economic data to provide a firm
substantive basis for choosing between Chicago and post-Chicago
theories arguably suggests that process concerns should play a primary
role in policymaking, and that courts should apply the analytical
method that minimizes the administrative costs of antitrust enfor-
cement.
Placing cost-benefit analysis at the center of antitrust
policymaking hardly resolves the questions raised by the debate
between the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools. It simply
recapitulates them in a slightly different format. No method of
antitrust enforcement can properly call itself inexpensive, but the fact-
intensive nature of post-Chicago's game theoretic approach is
concededly more costly than the highly presumptive methodology of
the Chicago School."8  The relative disparity in process costs,
184. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics ofAntitrust: Transaction Cost Con-
siderations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (1974). Strictly speaking, the transaction cost
approach (1) recognizes that firms and markets are alternative instruments for completing
commercially-related transactions, and (2) asks which mode is the more efficient
mechanism for doing so, under the circumstances. Id. at 1442. Antitrust policymakers
arguably face a similar dilemma: choosing between alternative approaches to achieving
the efficiency goal. Making this choice requires consideration of the relative costs of the
Chicago and post-Chicago models.
185. As Justice Brennan has noted, "[Clourts are of limited utility in examining difficult
economic problems.... [They are] ill-equipped and ill-[suited] for such decisionmaking
[and cannot] analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the
endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such decisions." United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609, 611-12 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted). Courts have long recognized their limitations in the realm of economic fact-
finding. For an early example, see the statement of Baron Bramwell in Manchester,
Sheffield & Lincolnshire Ry. v. Brown, 8 App. Cas. 703,716 (1883) ("[H]ere is a contract
made by a fishmonger and a carrier of fish who know their business, and whether it is just
and reasonable is to be settled by me who am neither fishmonger nor carrier, nor with any
knowledge of their business.").
186. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990); see also
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (characterizing rule of reason
inquiry as "incredibly complicated and prolonged" and "so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken").
187. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. By replacing the presumptive (but
arguably mistaken) certainty of the per se approach with the fact-intensive inquiries
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however, results directly from the philosophical differences separating
the two schools. Post-Chicago's belief in the distorting effects of
market imperfections necessitates the factual investigations and
complex assessments that Chicago's perfect-market presumption
conscientiously avoids. It is hardly surprising therefore that Chicago
offers the lower cost methodology: Its basic assumptions demand a
more simplified method. Consequently, a process-driven approach to
antitrust analysis is no more, or less, objective than a substance-driven
one. Indeed, it disguises a substantive choice by labeling it
procedural, but without attempting to resolve the empirical dilemma
at the core of the substantive debate.
Moreover, even in its own blinkered terms, the cost-benefit
approach to antitrust process is indeterminate. Lower process costs
by themselves do not necessarily advance the interests of the legal
system. As Judge Easterbrook notes, the system should strive to
"minimize the sum of error and process costs."'" Since Chicagoans
believe that error costs are most likely to arise from mistaken judicial
proscriptions of beneficial business practices, they view their cautious
and simplified methodology as an important brake against both error
and process costs.'89 From a post-Chicago perspective, however, the
cost of judicial restraint-harmful behavior unpunished, anticom-
petitive tendencies undiminished, and malevolent actors undis-
couraged-substantially outweighs the risk of judicial temerity. In
their view, the additional efficiencies produced by aggressive
enforcement justify, on cost-benefit grounds, the necessary investment
in higher process costs.
The narrower debate over transaction costs thus encapsulates the
broader theoretical dispute about the efficiency effects of controver-
demanded by the rule of reason, the Chicago approach has clearly helped raise the cost
of antitrust litgation. See, eg., Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt"
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 303 (1986) (stating that
the rule of reason "make[s] virtually all data relevant"); Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, supra note 17, at 12-13 ("Litigation costs are the: product of vague rules
combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in antitrust
litigation under the Rule of Reason."). But see Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 1,
at 225 (characterizing post-Chicago economics as "both more complex and more
ambiguous than the Chicago School model," and indicating that this complexity poses
difficulties for enforcement agencies).
188. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 86, at 977.
189. Id. at 977-78; see also Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 17, at 15-17
(indicating that the costs of judicial error far exceed the risk of wrongly permitted
monopoly); Easterbrook, AllocatingAntitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, supra note 11, at 311-
12 (applying the principles of business judgment cases to market power in antitrust cases).
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sial business behavior. In each case, exclusively economic models
yield markedly different answers to the substantive questions most
important to antitrust policy. Similarly, the lack of pertinent data
precludes meaningful debate and permits both schools to lay claim to
the mantle of greater efficiency. Given the absence of an economics
meta-theory,' g°  the resulting deadlock effectively prevents
policymakers from resolving the debate on economic grounds.
To be sure, the interpretive schism in contemporary antitrust
economics does not leave the economic model bereft of explanatory
power. Post-Chicagoans would doubtless agree that Chicago's limited
enforcement objective-"prosecuting plain vanilla cartels and mergers
to monopoly"' 91-marks an appropriate starting point for
government intervention. Both schools relegate the issue of anticom-
petitive intent to a minor role in antitrust doctrine;"9 and, in the
absence of meaningful market imperfections, both would tend to
attribute novel business arrangements to the efficiency motive.' 19
Their doctrinal and methodological differences, though, are more
profound than their agreements, and cast new light on the importance
of normative choice in the development of antitrust economic theory.
Ultimately, in order to resolve this quintessentially economic debate
by nonformalistic means," poicymakers must import into antitrust
discourse the value discussion that economists have long disdained.
190. Meta-theory either synthesizes the sub-theories that it purports to explain or offers
a theoretical basis for evaluating and distinguishing between competing theories. See, e.g.,
Larry A. Alexander, Modem Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and
Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 3 n.* (1981); see also Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 n.2 (quoting Professor Lipson's remark that
"anything you can do, I can do meta").
191. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 65, at 1701.
192. Professors Brodley and Ma speak for Chicagoans and post-Chicagoans alike, in
observing that "intent evidence is generally inferior to objective evidence because
competitive and anticompetitive motivations are often indistinguishable." Brodley & Ma,
supra note 22, at 1201; see also 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 60, 714.2c, at 440
(Supp. 1994) (discussing the evidentiary difficulty of distinguishing anticompetitive intent
from a lawful intention to compete).
193. See, e.g., Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 7, at 275 ("[E]conomizing
remains the main case [in antitrust analysis] to which appropriate strategic qualifications
are added.").
194. In cases where Chicago and post-Chicago economists disagree about the efficiency
effects of challenged practices, courts could choose between the competing approaches on
formal grounds admittedly unrelated to consumer welfare, such as the projected costs of
judicial administration (regardless of the magnitude of the welfare benefits associated with
the lower cost approach).
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V. THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
At bottom, the debate between Chicago and post-Chicago
economists implicates contending articles of political faith. Although
the disputants fail to acknowledge it, the absence of empirical proof
about the efficiency effects of many business practices, the com-
petitive consequences of large firm size, the proclivity of firms to
collude, and the efficacy of government intervention has not only
retarded the emergence of clear answers to the questions under
debate, but has also obscured the very nature of that debate. While
on one level the disputes appear intensely factual and seem capable
of resolution through proof of how markets and government actually
work, the practical impossibility of resolving these fundamental factual
questions has effectively disguised an ideological argument as a
seemingly scientific one.
On an important normative question, of course, the disputants
are in complete agreement. Both schools contend that considerations
of alocative efficiency alone should guide antitrust policy. Their
debate centers on the answers to subsidiary questions regarding the
best means of attaining that agreed-upon end. Thus, to the question
of how best to promote allocative efficiency, Chicagoans would
suggest very limited government intervention, while post-Chicagoans
would encourage more aggressive intervention. To the question of
why refrain (or intervene), Chicagoans would claim that, for the most
part, markets function efficiently and courts do not. Post-Chicagoans
would argue precisely the opposite. When pressed, however, to
produce empirical support for their assertions about the workings of
markets and government, both sides must acknowledge the lack of
definitive support and admit that their theses rest on unproven beliefs
about markets and government.
Conceivably, econometrics could fill the factual gaps in the
Chicago/post-Chicago debate. Sophisticated measurement tools or
complicated cross-national experiments could supply the economic
data necessary to resolve the dispute. As a practical matter, though,
the necessary information is currently unattainable. Existing
mechanisms of economic measurement are incapable of determining
the comparative efficiencies associated with different business
practices or quantifying the impact of market imperfections on any
particular sector of the economy. Many relevant facts are unobser-
vable, while others can be observed-that is, their existence can be
noted-but not measured. The durable empirical uncertainty that
characterizes the current state of antitrust economics thus invests the
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contending statements of economic theory with the kind of ideological
quality that Chicagoans found objectionable in the work of their
Modem Populist critics. The arguments of Chicagoans and post-
Chicagoans alike implicitly rest on a belief in the superiority of the
particular ideological visions embodied in the assumptions of their
respective models.
The visions that inform this dispute, though not necessarily
partisan, are ideological in the sense that they rest on untested ideas
and beliefs about the larger culture. 5 Chicagoans believe that, left
alone, markets will almost always function competitively, that market
imperfections are transitory and largely inconsequential, and that
government intervention usually does more harm than good. In
contrast, post-Chicagoans believe that imperfections and the private
benefits of collusion frequently facilitate the breakdown of com-
petition, that small firms are especially vulnerable to victimization,
and that government intervention usually increases social welfare.
These conflicting beliefs reflect differing views about the
motivations behind corporate behavior, the explanatory power of
economic theory, and the competence of governmental decision-
makers. For Chicagoans, the efficiency of the market is assured by
the profit motive. On their view, the drive to maximize profit leads
firms to compete away market imperfections, cheat on co-conspirators
and collaborators,'96 and implement practices that enhance con-
sumer welfare. Under this model, firms behave selfishly and
atomistically, but, as theory instructs, with mostly positive effect. The
model posits that theory is powerful and that courts, ill-informed and
of dubious competence, are highly imperfect laboratories for testing
theory, more apt to diminish social welfare than to improve it.
For post-Chicagoans, corporate nature is selfish but not neces-
sarily atomistic. In their view, firms do not inevitably compete away
market imperfections; whenever possible, they take anticompetitive
195. "Ideology" is defined as, among other things, a "set of doctrines or beliefs forming
the basis of a political or economic system." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1992) 896. The philosopher Raymond Geuss has
described this form of ideology as "descriptive," encompassing the "beliefs" held by
members of a particular group, "the concepts they use, the attitudes and psychological
dispositions they exhibit, their motives, desires, values, predilections, [etc.]." RAYMOND
GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL
4-5 (1981).
196. For example, see the opinions of Judge Posner in FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868
F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989); and Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
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advantage of them. Moreover, imperfections may often make
collusion the profit-maximizing strategy, and market structure may
facilitate the monitoring and enforcement necessary to keep cartels
intact."9  Post-Chicagoans believe that the power of economic
theory depends on accurate factual premises, and that broadly
assumptive theories, like Chicago's, cannot adequately explain or
predict real-world behavior. Their model implicitly posits that courts
can differentiate between efficient and inefficient practices, and en-
courages government involvement in the marketplace.
In important respects the political differences dividing the
Chicago and post-Chicago Schools formed the subject matter of
Chicago's earlier debate with its Modem Populist critics. The Modem
Populists presaged the post-Chicagoans' concern for market imperfec-
tions and competitive process, its suspicion of large firms, and its faith
in the promise of government intervention. Indeed, because the
debate between the Chicago and Modem Populist Schools expressly
concerned itself with the relationship between subjective political
values and the goals of antitrust, Chicago's clear victory seemed to
signal an end to normative dispute in antitrust discourse.
In the contemporary debate, by contrast, the normative questions
do not announce themselves. Instead they lie embedded in technical
disagreements over the means most conducive to the agreed-upon
goal of consumer welfare. Having successfully established the
primacy of economic analysis, moreover, the participants in the
current debate may share a professionally understandable reluctance
to reopen earlier disagreements which they had endeavored for so
long to end. Consequently, the normative differences dividing
antitrust economists have thus far escaped explicit acknowledgement
and frank discussion. But this absence of frank discussion does not
make antitrust economics any less value-laden.
These fundamental differences pose a dilemma for antitrust
decisionmakers who favor an exclusively economic analysis. Before
the emergence of post-Chicago theory, Chicago's approach provided
seemingly coherent answers to all relevant economic questions.
Chicagoans could confidently assert, and decisionmakers could
comfortably accept, the proposition that antitrust policy based upon
the goal of consumer welfare "calls for price theory, and.., for those
rules, and only those rules, that can be justified in terms of price
197. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 113, at 297-98; Baker, Recent Developments, supra note
14, at 648-49.
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theory."'98  In rejecting price theory as the sole mechanism for
examining consumer welfare, post-Chicago thought not only casts
doubt on the body of law generated by Chicago scholars but also, and
more significantly, on their basic assumptions.
Contemporary decision makers should recognize that the "Church
of Chicago,"'99 if it ever was canonical, has encountered its own
reformative challenge. The emergence of the post-Chicago School has
brought in its wake empirical and philosophical uncertainty about the
infallibility of Chicago orthodoxy. The uncertainty surrounding the
economic aspects of the economists' debate effectively requires courts
and policymakers to choose between contending economic approaches
on grounds that are essentially political. The nature of this choice has
thus far gone unacknowledged, and in important respects the Kodak
opinion and the ensuing commentary have overlooked it."° But
because economic criteria afford no basis for distinguishing between
Chicago and post-Chicago theory, decisionmakers must resolve this
prototypical economic debate by resorting to politically laden
judgments about firms, markets, government, and courts.
The general idea that value judgments might shape the formation
of economic theory, and that competing theories might therefore
reflect competing values, is hardly surprising. In the past twenty
years, philosophers of science have reached broad consensus on the
view that normative substrata underlie the foundation of scientific
theory. Many contend that the development of scientific theory
hinges unconsciously, but in significant measure, upon its correspon-
dence with the value system of the theory-builder, and that the
acceptance of theory depends upon the social context in which it
appears? °' Others argue that when opportunities for data-gathering
198. Bork, The Role of the Courts, supra note 58, at 24.
199. See Frederick Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusion of Models: The
Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1512-13 (1984) ("[T]he rising
vogue is economic efficiency taught by an ascendant Chicago School.... [A]ntitrust is
becoming a religion without a cause.").
200. See supra notes 13847 and accompanying text. This is certainly not to suggest that
courts have explicitly recognized the political questions implicated in the antitrust
economics debate. To the contrary, though it expressed a clear preference for post-
Chicago analysis, the Kodak Court offered no explanation for that preference. It is to
suggest that the Court's decision to adopt post-Chicago analysis was in essence a political
one, and that antitrust jurisprudence would benefit from recognizing this fact and from an
ongoing dialogue about the values that should inform judicial analysis.
201. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111-
35, 171-73 (2d ed. 1970).
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are limited, "scientists may have nothing but aesthetics ... to guide
them.
,, 2
On this view, even when scientists honestly see themselves as
pursuing neutral or objective truth, their work is ineradicably colored
by social, cultural, and political values.' Obviously, the recognition
that non-scientific values sometimes define the scientific enterprise
does not spell the end of empirical inquiry, or counsel against the
continued pursuit of objective knowledge. It does, however,
underscore the importance of identifying the evaluative sub-structure
of scientific theory and recognizing how it may either enhance or limit
the theory's validity. No less than law, science has ceased to be, if it
ever was, a collection of autonomous disciplines. 204 The contem-
porary dispute about how to maximize consumer welfare cannot be
resolved on purely scientific grounds. The impasse produced by the
inadequacy of empirical proof and the limitations of economic theory
effectively force decisionmakers to look past the text of the debate,
and to choose between the contending schools on the basis of the
relative soundness of the metaphysical assumptions underlying their
respective enforcement models.'
Reconsider the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 6 By adopting the
post-Chicago approach to informational imperfections in the face of
theoretical and empirical uncertainty about the commercial sig-
nificance of market imperfections, the Kodak majority implicitly
embraced post-Chicago's normative assumptions about the workings
of markets, the competence of courts, and the wisdom of aggressive
antitrust enforcement. The Court weighed in on the side of those
202. DAVID LINDLEY, THE END OF PHYSICS: THE MYTH OF A UNIFIED THEORY 11
(1993).
203. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) (chronicling the
history of biological determinism, and concluding that the racial, gender, and ethnic biases
that affected the scientific community's approach to human intelligence demonstrate the
inescapable influence exerted by values and beliefs on the process of scientific inquiry);
see also STEWART RICHARDS, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: AN
INTRODUCFION 44-70, 202 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing development of scientific methods in
the context of individual beliefs and value systems, and the scientific community).
204. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761,761 (1987).
205. Forty-five years ago, Felix Cohen observed that "fjiudges and non-judges who
denounce metaphysics do not thereby escape metaphysics. Nor do they establish the truth
of their own metaphysical assumptions. All they establish is their unawareness of their
own basic assumptions." Felix Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238,
260 (1950).
206. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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who believe that market imperfections can seriously distort com-
petitive balance, that courts can competently resolve the factual
questions associated with the investigation of those imperfections, and
that the efficiency benefits conferred by judicial scrutiny of those
imperfections exceed the costs of that scrutiny.
Though camouflaged by its distinctly economic coloration, the
Kodak decision turned on the acceptance of assumptions that are
essentially political in nature. Indeed, the fact that Justice Blackmun
wrote for the "post-Chicago" majority, and that Justice Scalia (joined
by Justices Thomas and O'Connor) authored the "Chicago" dissent,
indicates that the economic theories expressly at issue in Kodak
concealed an important normative dispute. It also reveals that the
post-Chicago School has effectively replaced the Modem Populist
School as the liberal alternative to Chicago. But above all, Kodak
demonstrates that, far from transcending political discourse, the
"exclusively" economic perspective simply shifts the focus of that
discourse from ends to means, altering its vocabulary, and thereby
dressing an old normative debate in new, technical clothing.
Finally, Kodak may also show that the Court remains willing to
discuss the ideological underpinnings of antitrust, but only under the
guise of performing economic analysis. This development is not
entirely unhealthy; an encrypted discussion of policy is better than no
discussion at all. Moreover, to the extent that the political values
informing the Court's economic analysis remain obscure to the
business community and unpredictable in application, they may
contribute to uncertainty in business decisionmaking and thus
implicitly encourage overcompliance with the antitrust laws.207
While this may be a pleasant possibility for some, overcompliance is
not an unmitigated good, since it may squelch socially beneficial in-
novations. More importantly, though, because one can only guess at
whether the Court intended to create any of these consequences, the
discussion in Kodak would have been far more productive had it
dispelled the illusion, simultaneously perpetuated and revealed by the
Chicago/post-Chicago debate, that economics provides objective,
nonpolitical answers to the important value questions that underlie
antitrust.
Antitrust economists have reached a "core" of consensus about
the significance of allocative efficiency and about easy cases of
207. See, eg., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 967-94 (1984) (arguing that legal
rules whose meaning or application is uncertain leads firms to overcomply with the law).
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inefficient business behavior. The current intramural debate,
however, illuminates a large "periphery" of uncertainty that encom-
passes all the difficult efficiency questions confronting antitrust. For
these hard questions, economics provides no definitive answers.
Consequently, decisionmakers facing those questions-no matter how
devoutly they may accept the core benefits of the economic ap-
proach-must ultimately look for their answers not in science but in
ideology.
CONCLUSION
Chicago scholars have insisted for a generation on denying any
role to political values in the shaping of antitrust doctrine. Antitrust
law, they have claimed, is perfectly suited to an exclusively economic
analysis. For them, simple economic rules are not only fully
explanatory and easily applied, but permit courts to avoid the
indeterminate value debates that plague other doctrinal areas, most
notably constitutional law. Their success in this endeavor, however,
has proved too short lived. By contesting the empirical basis of
Chicago's assumptions about how markets work and by
demonstrating, albeit unintentionally, the role of ideological contin-
gency in the formation of economic theory, the post-Chicago School
has not only destabilized the previously calm world of antitrust
economics. It has at the same time suggested a future in which many
schools of economic thought, various and contested, might vie for
analytical supremacy. In that world, the expanded range of economic
theory available to antitrust decisionmakers would make explicit what
is now largely obscure: Choosing between economic theories is as
much an act of politics as of science. Antitrust and constitutional law
may not be so different after all.
Like other scientists, antitrust economists may wish to deny the
subjectivity of their enterprise. In their view, perhaps, the ascendancy
of an exclusively economic model, and the self-evident nature of its
universal truths, should have brought an end to political discussions
in antitrust analysis. The triumph of economics should have ushered
in an age of consensus about the goal of antitrust policy, disturbed
only by minor disagreements over the means to that end. Because
they cannot be resolved either theoretically or empirically, however,
the disputes that concern contemporary antitrust economists testify
forcefully to the unavailability of a transcendent economic perspective
and demonstrate the durability of the ideological questions that
economists have sought to banish from antitrust discourse. In this
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way, the current age of economic disputation illuminates, as no earlier
debates have, the irreducible normative basis of antitrust law.
